The effect of context on third parties and third-party support in the United States by Chamberlain, Adam Sander
  
THE EFFECT OF CONTEXT ON THIRD PARTIES AND THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
Adam Sander Chamberlain 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Political Science. 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Thomas Carsey 
 
Virginia Gray 
 
James Stimson 
 
John Aldrich 
 
Jason Roberts 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
ADAM SANDER CHAMBERLAIN:  The Effect of Context on Third Parties and Third-
Party Support in the United States 
(Under the direction of Thomas Carsey) 
 
 
The dissertation explores third parties from a contextual perspective, moving 
away from the traditional view of third party support as being merely the product of anti-
party or anti-system sentiment. I study how context affects third party support in modern 
presidential elections, the development of third party voting in the 1800s through an 
empirical case study of Vermont from 1841-1854, and third party behavior in an electoral 
context that allows cross-endorsements (fusion balloting). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Throughout American history, third parties, or those political parties that are not 
classified as the two largest parties on the national level, have been influential in shifting 
the course of American politics.  For example, the Anti-Masonic Party of the 1830s was 
able to gain power in several Northeastern states in the wake of a dying Federalist Party; 
the Liberty and Free Soil Parties were able to advance a message of limiting the spread of 
slavery; the Populists were able to force the major parties, specifically the Democrats, to 
incorporate elements of its platform into the Democratic message; and Ralph Nader’s 
2000 run for the White House as the Green Party presidential candidate has often been 
considered the reason George Bush was able to win Florida by a very narrow margin, 
thus securing enough Electoral College votes to be elected president.   
Third parties have also been influential at the state and local levels, sometimes 
winning and controlling governments.  Prominent examples include the success of the 
Social Democrats in Wisconsin and the City of Milwaukee during the first half of the 20th 
Century and the current power of the Vermont Progressive Party in the City of Burlington 
and, to a lesser degree, in the state capitol of Montpelier.  Thus, there are numerous 
examples of how third parties have gained power and/or influenced the political 
landscape. 
 There is an existing literature in political science which speaks directly to what 
factors led to individual votes for third parties and their candidates in a particular 
2 
 
election, how the vote totals a party receives are sometimes related to the requirements 
for obtaining ballot space, and how long term trends have shown a natural decline in third 
party voting since the late 1800s-early 1900s. However, this literature has failed to 
adequately address the issue of geographically-defined context and its effects on 
individual and party behavior in relation to third parties. My goal in this dissertation is to 
offer new theoretical insights into third parties and third party support by understanding 
how the contextual dynamic plays a crucial role in determining support for, and the 
functionality of, third parties.  The common theme that runs through all three chapters of 
this dissertation is that third parties, and the behaviors of individuals in relation to third 
parties, are affected by geographically-defined contexts.  Additionally, this dissertation 
will be able to speak to scholars in American politics more generally by adding to our 
store of knowledge on context, political development, state politics, and party 
organizations.  
The first chapter will posit that individuals in areas with a history of voting for 
third parties will be affected by this tradition.  In areas with higher levels of past third 
party voting, residents will be generally more aware of potential and current third party 
candidates and will assess these candidates differently than residents of areas with a weak 
history of third party voting.  This geographically-based “subcultural” dynamic will 
affect how individuals feel about current third party candidates and their potential vote 
choice, providing evidence that context can have an effect on individual behavior in 
relation to non-major party candidates. 
The second chapter posits that past research on third parties from a historical 
perspective, which focus on the decline in third party voting since the 1800s and early 
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1900s, cannot explain how third parties were able to develop their bases of support and 
sustain such support over time.  I argue that third parties relied on the social dynamics of 
the town during the 1800s, and support this viewpoint with town-level voting and 
demographic data in the state of Vermont during the 1840s and 1850s.  Through this 
empirical case study, I am able to uncover some of the ways in which third party support 
developed in this era of American history. 
The third chapter investigates the state of New York, where fusion balloting 
allows minor parties to cross-endorse major party candidates; this has created minor 
parties that are consistently involved in elections from year-to-year.  However, research 
has not uncovered how these parties, in a relatively unique institutional (and geographic) 
context, view their political roles.  For example, are they able to influence policy and 
election outcomes in ways not seen through looking at legislative voting records and 
election results?  How do individuals within the parties feel about their chosen party’s 
abilities to be successful without cross-endorsement?  To answer such questions, I 
interview minor party activists in the state to learn more about their perceptions of their 
party’s successes and gain a better understanding of how these parties are able to be 
successful organizations in regards to both policy and elections.  
The fourth chapter draws out the implications of the three chapters for the study 
of third parties.  I argue that third parties were more successful in the 1800s by taking 
advantage of prevailing conditions and building party support from the “bottom-up,” 
whereas third parties and major independent candidates today focus on major elections 
and do not generate the same levels of support over the course of multiple elections.  
Because of this failure to develop geographic support bases in the population, third 
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parties and major independent candidates are failing to convert their popularity in 
particular elections into sustained support.  I then argue that the adoption of the fusion 
ballot has the potential to alleviate some of these concerns yet still allow minor parties to 
build via a “bottom-up” approach. I also point out that current and future third parties 
should be more cognizant of geographic support, and the effect of context on particular 
voters, when attempting to build the party.  Finally, I provide details on future projects 
that can grow from the research presented in the earlier chapters. 
Taking the four chapters together, the information presented reveals new insights 
into third parties, context, state politics, and electoral systems. This dissertation has the 
potential to add to our store of scholarly knowledge on these topics while providing third 
party practitioners with information that could be useful in future elections.  In other 
words, the dissertation has academic and normative importance, and I hope you (the 
readers) find the topics as engaging as I do.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 
THE EFFECT OF CONTEXT ON SUPPORT FOR THIRD-PARTY CANDIDATES 
 
In political science, one line of inquiry has focused on the social, contextual 
nature of politics.  Scholars such as Lazarsfeld and Berelson focused on how individuals 
are politically influenced by those they deal with on a daily basis (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; 
Berelson et al. 1954).  Recent research has confirmed that there are social dynamics to 
political behavior, such as voting, which cannot always be discerned through simple 
survey responses (Beck et al. 2002).  An individual's characteristics, which may help 
predict such actions as voting, are often better understood when placed within a particular 
social context, such as one's neighborhood or workplace (see Finifter 1974; Huckfeldt 
1979).   
 Research in American politics has not appropriately addressed this contextual 
dynamic regarding third (minor) political parties and independent candidates.  Studies 
that have focused on third party supporters have emphasized the individual's voting 
calculus (Gold 1995; Gold 2005; Southwell 2003) or used aggregate-level data of third 
party vote totals over time (Rosenstone et al. 1984; Chressanthis and Shaffer 1993; 
Hirano and Snyder 2007).1  However, such research is limited since it does not address 
                                                 
1
 Of course, the research could also be distinguished by the many studies that focus on individual 
candidates, regardless of methods.  Largely, these studies can be split into those that focus on George 
Wallace (Crespi 1971; Wright 1977; Canfield 1983) or H. Ross Perot (Rapoport and Stone 2005; Koch 
1998; Feigert 1993). 
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the contextual aspects of third party support.  Since scholars like Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) 
and Huckfeldt (1986) have found that a person's immediate social environment has a 
strong effect on one's political orientations, it is likely that a person’s environment also 
can affect her views toward third parties and their candidates. 
 I argue in this paper that a subculture supportive of third parties pervades 
particular geographic areas, such that past support for third parties in certain locations 
will affect how individuals in those locations assess future third party candidates.  Using 
vote percentages by county for major independent and third party candidates as the 
context measuring the subculture, I find that support in 2000 for Ralph Nader 
significantly changes based on an interactive effect between a respondent’s ideology and 
her county context.  However, this effect evolves over the course of the election cycle.  I 
also discover that vote choice is affected by the third party subculture.  These results 
provide evidence that context matters for individuals’ support of third party candidates, a 
finding that has yet to be shown in the political science literature. 
 
Developing the Theory of a Subculture 
  
 The theory of a third party subculture is based on constant interactions individuals 
have with others in their environment, including, but not limited to, the workplace, home 
life, and other arenas of socialization.  Past research has emphasized that individuals 
exposed to certain community values tend to reflect these values.  As Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, and Gaudet note in The People's Choice, “People who work or live or play 
together are likely to vote for the same candidates” (1948).  This same viewpoint is 
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reflected almost forty years later when Robert Huckfeldt, studying the impact of 
neighborhoods on political behavior, reaffirmed the importance of “geographically based 
social relations” (150, 1986).   
 However, these studies focused on the influence of one’s community and 
geographic location on political attitudes toward major parties.  Third parties rarely win 
elections, and they often receive a paltry number of votes.  Even when there is a 
successful third party candidate, his vote share may only be 15 or 20%.  
This means that the geographically-based support for third parties should best be 
labeled, in the terminology of Heinz Eulau, as a subculture (79, 1963).  That is, while 
there are larger cultures one is a part of, an individual can also be part of a political 
culture that is “set off by other patterns that are relatively unique to itself.”  For instance, 
all 50 states constitute an American culture, yet within this framework, Vermont could be 
said to have a different culture than Alabama.  Within Vermont, cities that share the 
national and state-specific culture might develop in different political directions; 
Bennington and Brattleboro might have unique differences that lend themselves to the 
definition of political subcultures within two broader, shared cultures. 
 In this paper, I argue that particular geographic locations (contexts) have a greater 
or lesser tendency to support third parties (a subculture), and this will affect the political 
behavior of those who live within the context.  Eulau notes that using culture to analyze 
behavior “seems more viable in a group,” which to him “refers to an institution, a local 
community...a geographical region...and so on.”  It appears, then, that Eulau's conception 
of culture fits nicely with the concept of a contextual analysis of third party support, and 
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for the purposes of this study, the terms context and subculture can be used 
interchangeably. 
 This contextual subcultural analysis is also supported by other research.  The best 
example of such research comes from Allen and Brox (2005), who correlated state-wide 
vote totals for a number of third party presidential candidates throughout the 20th Century 
(Debs, Roosevelt, LaFollette, George Wallace, Anderson, Perot, and Nader).  While the 
authors focus on the highest recent correlation between Nader and Anderson (.73), there 
are some fairly surprising correlations over long periods of time, such as a .54 correlation 
between Perot in 1992 and LaFollette in 1924.  With additional individual-level analysis, 
Allen and Brox argue that this “suggests that an anti-party or anti-system sentiment is at 
work.”  Collet and Hansen (2002) put forth a very basic OLS regression model that also 
shows similar results, where past county-level vote totals for third party presidential 
candidates helped predict county-level vote totals for other third party presidential 
candidates.  For instance, Perot's 1992 county-level results helped predict county-level 
Nader results in 2000, but Perot's 1996 county-level results did not. 
In contrast, Reiter and Walsh (1995) and Gold (2005) argue that an “alternative 
culture” of third party voting does not exist.  However, these studies do not approach the 
topic from a contextual, subcultural perspective, but rely on finding consistency across 
demographic predictors to uncover a “culture.”  For example, Gold (2005) takes evidence 
of women voting more highly for one third party candidates, but less for another, as proof 
that a culture of third party voting does not exist.  This is not truly what a culture is, as a 
subculture can be present but have a different effect on individuals within the subcultural 
context. 
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To be more specific, I argue that in areas where the subculture is strongest, 
individuals will develop a different perspective about how to approach elections and the 
party system than areas with a weak subculture.  First, the experience of living in an area 
with a tendency to vote outside the two party system means that individuals will likely 
interact with voters who have cast third party votes, influencing their perspective on 
voting.  Second, this past tendency to support third party candidates will lead to an 
increased awareness of current third party candidacies, allowing individuals to make 
more informed decisions about these candidates.  This idea mirrors findings from Beck 
(2002) that show people more likely to support Perot if other people they converse with 
also support Perot. 
I also argue that particular individual-level characteristics will vary the effects of 
context from election to election, and over the course of an election.2  Two such factors 
are ideology and partisan identification, which are strong predictors of opinion and 
voting.  Taking these into consideration, it would seem unlikely that all individuals, 
across ideologies and parties, would be more supportive of a third party candidate in an 
area that experienced higher third party voting in the past.  In fact, there are probably two 
core reactions:  some groups are positively affected by the subculture and other groups 
negatively so, especially if the third party candidate has a somewhat distinct ideological 
orientation.  For example, strong partisans in these contexts should exhibit the strongest 
positive and negative reactions, as they would be more sensitive to the ideological 
orientations of the non-major party candidate.   
                                                 
2
 The mechanism behind this could be through close friendship networks, but research tends to find that the 
vehicle for such influence occurs through acquaintances or “weak ties” (Granvovetter 1973). 
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 Furthermore, the election cycle itself needs to be considered as a crucial 
component.  Individuals who want to have a legitimate effect on an election will not want 
to “waste” their support or vote on a candidate who will not win, especially in a close 
election between major party candidates.  Individuals do not want to be perceived as 
supporting a third party candidate that could swing an election to a less desirable major 
party candidate because the major party candidate closest to them does not receive their 
support. When Election Day gets closer, and when individuals begin to see that the 
election is close, many will begin to change their views about third party candidates that 
could serve as “upsetters” in the election.  This effect should be most noted by those in 
strong subcultures, where the history and tradition of supporting third parties is greatest 
and the ramifications of support are best understood. 
 Needless to say, this could promote problems from a data standpoint.  First, 
subcultures are naturally beneath a broader culture, and most surveys of individuals 
sample across contexts, making it hard to discern when such a subculture is present.  
Using data sets that record respondents and their discussion partners, and other contexts 
in which they socialize like workplaces or places of worship, are also problematic (see 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1984 data set; for use of data, see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). 
Though this style of data contains information about conversation partners and 
interactions among individuals, it restricts the researcher to only one or two particular 
geographic contexts.  However, ample evidence from earlier studies confirms that people 
within geographically-defined contexts and discussion networks tend to behave in 
politically similar manners. There is no reason to doubt these findings in relation to 
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viable third party and independent candidates even though the specific underlying causal 
mechanism cannot be shown. 
Second, if one wanted to isolate individuals who vote for third party candidates in 
a national survey, there would be few cases to study, even in “good” election years.  Still, 
as Eulau points out, “The technical difficulty of discovering cultural patterns in diverse 
areas of behavior [third party support, for example] must not be confused with the 
absence of patterns.” Thus, studying a subculture with survey data requires a shift away 
from voting as the only standard of assessment. 
It is my contention that this reliance on vote choice neglects certain aspects of a 
third party subculture that using favorability scales can help uncover.  For example, an 
individual in an area known for its support of third parties may choose to vote for a major 
party in an election because of particular candidate characteristics, the state of the 
economy, or some other factor.  This would lead to the conclusion that the context failed 
to affect the individual.   
However, this individual could still hold a favorable opinion of a third party 
candidate, above and beyond what a similar person would feel towards that third party 
candidate if he or she came from an area less supportive of such candidates in the past.  
In this way, the person is still influenced by the subculture, yet makes a particular 
decision in an election that does not lead to voting for a third party candidate. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
12 
 
 From the previous sections, several hypotheses can be derived. To do this, two of 
the concepts discussed earlier must be detailed.  First, “context” or “subculture,” which 
can be used interchangeably in this article, is measured as the percentage(s) of past third 
voting in a particular geographic area.  This provides the best proxy to measure an area’s 
tendency to support third party candidates.  “Stronger” subcultures are those areas with a 
past history of above average third party voting; “weak” subcultures are those areas with 
a history of low-levels of third party voting.  Second, candidates that are “favorable” are 
those that respondents place more highly on a traditional favorability scale, an easy way 
to aggregate individual perceptions of a candidate into one scale.       
With these concepts put forth, the first hypothesis is the “baseline” hypothesis:  as 
previous voting for third parties in a context increases, respondents will be more 
favorable towards current third party candidates.  This is to test whether context alone is a 
driving force in understanding support for third party candidates.   
However, as noted in the theory above, I argue that the contextual effect will be 
dependent on an individual’s ideology and partisanship, implying an interactive, not 
direct, effect of context.  For ideology, I hypothesize that, as previous voting for third 
parties in a context increases, favorability will increase or decrease more for the strong 
ideologues and less so for those less ideological and moderates.  In other words, I expect 
to see liberals and conservatives reacting more across contexts than moderates, and that 
stronger subcultures will lead to more extreme increases/decreases in favorability.  
Whether there will be an increase or decrease in favorability will depend upon the 
ideological orientation of the candidate/third party, with conservatives being more 
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attracted to conservative candidates and liberals being more attracted to liberal 
candidates.  
 After controlling for ideology, the effects of partisanship are less clear.  By 
nature, third party candidates do not have a large, built-in partisan base.  Even those 
classified under third parties who are truly major independent candidates do not 
necessarily receive support from self-identified independents, who may support 
Democrats and Republicans dependent on the election. Still, I hypothesize that, as 
previous voting for third parties in a context increases, favorability will increase or 
decrease more for partisans than for Independents.  Again, the increases/decreases are 
dependent on whether a third party candidate is more proximate in his policy positions to 
the Republicans or Democrats. 
 The exceptions to these hypotheses occur when a third party candidate is 
perceived to be a potential upsetter in a close election.  The ideological and major party 
identifiers closest to a third party candidate would fear supporting him if it meant that the 
other major party candidate would win.  For example, if Election Day was approaching 
and polls showed a tight race between the Democrats and Republicans for President, 
conservative and Republican supporters of a conservative third party candidate would 
begin to reconsider their support, as it could cost the ideologically-closer Republican 
candidate the election.  These movements away from the third party candidate will be 
more pronounced in stronger third party subcultures, as these areas have more experience 
with, and a better understanding of, the potential ramifications of third party support.  Of 
course, when the election is not perceived to be close, then this movement away will not 
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be present or will not be as exaggerated.   This is why the election cycle itself needs to be 
considered a crucial element when studying third party subcultural support. 
 
Contextual Analysis of Third Party Favorability 
 
To test these expectations, I use the first and last samples from the National 
Annenberg Election Study's (NAES) 2000 rolling cross-sectional sample.  From 
December 14th, 1999 to April 3, 2000, respondents were asked a battery of questions that 
included favorability scales for presidential candidates, including Ralph Nader, whose 
2000 candidacy was the largest third party run in the election cycle.  This was repeated in 
the final wave of the survey administered over the month prior to Election Day, from 
October 3rd, 2000 to November 6th, 2000.    
The dependent variable for the first set of models will be Nader’s favorability on a 
scale ranging from 0-100, with a higher score indicating a more positive evaluation.  
After these models, an additional model of vote choice will be presented using the final 
wave only, with the dependent variable being categorized as a likely vote for Bush, Gore, 
Nader, or Buchanan. 
As well, a number of theoretically-relevant predictors and controls will be added 
to the models.  First, to measure subculture through context, the criterion for this study is 
the county-level vote percentage for H. Ross Perot in 1996, plus two average measures of 
county-level vote percentage of Perot in both 1992 and 1996 and Anderson in 1980 and 
Perot in 1992 and 1996.  These three measures provide a thorough test for the subculture 
argument by evaluating the added effect of including earlier non-major party candidacies 
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into the equation. The NAES provides a FIPs code for each respondent, which is a 
Census designation for a county. Using the FIPs code, percentages of the vote for each of 
these candidates can be attached to each individual, placing that person in a more or less 
favorable third party environment.   
 The NAES also asks about people's party identification and ideology.  Earlier 
studies note that support for third party candidates comes largely from self-identified 
independents (for example, Chressanthis and Shaffer 1993). Ideology should also have an 
effect on one's views toward Nader, as his past political activities, and his membership in 
the Green Party, place him clearly to the left-of-center on a specific set of issues. 
Controlling for other factors, Nader's support base should be among the most liberal 
respondents and Democrats and Independents, with the weakest support among 
conservative identifiers and Republicans.      
 This effect of ideology and partisanship will be studied through an interactive 
effect with context.  If areas with stronger third party subcultures lead to more 
information and discussion about third parties and their candidates, then respondents of 
various ideologies and partisan identifications will use this knowledge in their candidate 
assessments and ultimately their vote choice.  For example, conservatives in weak third 
party subcultures will have less information upon which to assess Nader, whereas 
conservatives in strong subculture have more information about which to assess Nader.  
This should lead to more negative responses toward Nader among conservative 
respondents in strong third party subcultures as they will have clearer views of his 
ideology.  Accordingly, the reverse scenario would be the case for liberal respondents.  
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Finally, these differences across ideology and partisanship could change over the course 
of the election. 
 As for other individual level predictors, the NAES contains basic demographics 
which are used in any model of vote prediction, such as age (younger to older), sex 
(0=female, 1=male), education (least to most educated), race (0=non-white, 1=white), 
and suburban and rural dummy variables (urban as a baseline).   Based on earlier 
research, it is expected that favorability towards Nader will be higher among men, those 
who achieve higher levels of education, and white respondents.  Additionally, I add two 
variables measuring general interest in government (most to least interested) and whether 
a respondent cares who wins the election (0=care; 1=does not care).  This helps to control 
for earlier findings that claim third party supporters are potentially “anti-system” and less 
likely to care about electoral outcomes. Finally, a variable measuring the percentage 
difference between the major parties in the 2000 election (lower to higher difference) is 
used in the models closest to the election to control for the distinct possibility that 
individuals in battleground states would be more concerned with how Nader could affect 
election outcomes.   
  
Results for Predicting Nader Favorability and Voting 
 
 Table 1 shows baseline models, which include context, ideology, and 
partisanship, but do not look for an interactive relationship.  Only the most basic and 
most complex measures of context are used (Perot 1996 and Perot 1996, 1992, and 
Anderson 1980).  Context is significantly and positively related to higher rankings of 
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Nader only in the month prior to the election and when both Perot and Anderson’s 
election returns are used as an average measure.  On the surface, this indicates that there 
is some support for the first hypothesis of a basic contextual effect. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 To see whether the effect of the subculture becomes clearer when studied in 
relation to ideology and partisanship, Table 2 displays the results with interactive effects 
included.  The first, third, and fifth columns correspond to the sample of respondents 
taken from the first wave of the NAES rolling cross-sectional survey, which went from 
December 14th, 1999 to April 3rd, 2000, and the second, fourth, and sixth columns 
correspond to the sample taken from the last wave of the survey taken over the month 
prior to Election Day, from October 3rd, 2000 to November 6th, 2000.  The two left 
columns use Perot 1996 vote percentages as the context measure, the two middle columns 
use Perot 1992 and 1996 averaged as the context measure, and the two right columns use 
an average of Anderson 1980 and Perot in 1992 and 1996.  As can be seen across the 
specifications, the interactions between ideology and context tend to be significant in the 
first, third, and fifth columns, but not in the second, fourth, and sixth columns.  
Partisanship interactions do not reach standard levels of significance in any model.3 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 Still, interactions should not be assessed solely on their significance (Brambor et 
al. 2005), so it is necessary to graphically display the results if a real story about context 
can be developed.  This is done in Figure 1 for Perot in 1996 in the early election sample, 
in relation to context and ideology, and in Figure 2, in relation to context and 
                                                 
3
 The interactions are calculated with the baseline ideology being strong conservatives.  As well, 
Republicans are the baseline party identification.  
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partisanship.  Graphing these relationships using the average measures of Perot in 1996 
and 1992, and Anderson in 1980, generate similar results, albeit slightly weaker (not 
shown). 
Strong liberals and liberals in contexts where Perot was more successful in 1996 
were much more supportive of Ralph Nader than liberals in contexts where Perot 
received smaller vote shares in 1996.  The reverse scenario is true for strong 
conservatives, though independents and self-identified conservatives do not appear to 
react differently toward Nader when they reside in areas that were more supportive of 
Ross Perot in 1996.  Both these findings comport with the hypothesized directions of the 
ideological, interactive relationship.  For partisanship, only Independents are affected, 
and they become less likely to support Nader in higher Perot contexts.  This does not 
comport with the hypothesized effect, but the expectations regarding partisanship were 
less clear to begin with and the effect is quite small (a -7 point decrease from weakest to 
strongest subculture). 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 It appears, then, that the areas where Perot did well in 1996 are areas that are in-
tune to other third party candidates, and the residents of these areas can react more 
positively or negatively to these candidates depending on their ideological and, to some 
degree, partisan leanings.  The difference in favorability between strong conservatives 
and strong liberals in counties where Perot received 5% of the vote is approximately 20 
points, and the difference in favorability for strong conservatives and conservatives at 
this level is almost exactly even.  In counties where Perot received 15% of the vote, the 
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difference is approximately 45 points.  With Nader’s campaign still operating under the 
media’s radar early on in the election season, areas where respondents were accustomed 
to recent third party voting in the form of Perot in 1996 had greater positive and negative 
reactions than those respondents in less supportive third party subcultures. 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
 The second, fourth, and sixth models in Table 2 show the same analysis run on a 
sample of respondents during the final month of the election.   Graphing these results 
allows for a comparison between the two samples to see what ideologies and partisan 
identifications shifted in their favorability toward Nader, dependent on context.  Such 
movements clearly occurred when we look at Figure 3, which also uses the Perot 1996 
context measure.  The biggest shift occurred among strong liberals in strong third party 
subcultures, who became less supportive of Nader by approximately 15 points, and strong 
liberals in less supportive third party subcultures, who became more supportive of Nader 
by approximately 15 points.   
Liberal identifiers in more supportive third party subcultures remained the same, 
while liberals in less supportive subcultures became more supportive as the campaign 
progressed.  There were also dips in support for Nader among conservatives, and 
especially among strong conservatives, in less supportive third party subcultures, while 
moderates remained unaffected.  Of course, liberals continued to rank Nader more highly 
than conservatives, but the gap narrowed in the more supportive Perot contexts and 
widened in the less supportive Perot contexts.  At 5% Perot support in 1996, the gap is 
about 40 points; at 15% Perot support in 1996, the gap is about 23 points.  The partisan 
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changes were smaller, with Republicans remaining about the same, Democrats in higher 
Perot contexts becoming less favorable toward Nader by about 10 points, and 
Independents in higher Perot contexts becoming slightly more favorable. 
 To account for these changes, especially in regards to ideology, part of the 
movement is likely caused by the increased exposure Nader received as the election 
campaign progressed; the difference of living in a subculture that is more supportive and 
interested in third parties dissipated once the national media began to report on the Nader 
phenomena.  As noted earlier, the theory underlying the third party subculture does not 
necessarily imply that areas of past third party support whole-heartedly support another 
third party candidate; electoral conditions can play a large role in determining how the 
subculture reacts. 4  Furthermore, this movement among strong liberal identifiers and 
Democrats follows the expectation about a close race between the two major party 
candidates. The media was reporting more about Nader, but a significant portion of this 
coverage was on the basis that Nader could pull votes away from Al Gore, leading to a 
victory for George W. Bush.5 This caused strong liberals and Democrats in strong third 
party subcultures to reorient their evaluations of Nader.   
                                                 
4
 Using National Election Study (NES) data from 1996 and 1992, I run the same analysis using Perot’s 
1992 county on Perot favorability in 1996 with the addition of a 1992 vote choice variable, as well as 
Anderson’s 1980 context on Perot favorability in 1992.  The results, provided in the Appendix, show that 
context in relation to ideology mattered, especially for those classified as extremely conservative or liberal.  
In 1992, both groups viewed Perot much more positively in areas where Anderson performed well in 1980.  
In 1996, both groups again exhibited the largest reactions after controlling for 1992 vote choice, with 
extremely conservative respondents in 1992 Perot contexts being more supportive than their counterparts in 
weaker contexts and extremely liberal respondents being less supportive than their counterparts.  Much like 
the Nader favorability models, the movements of less ideologically extreme respondents, and those who 
classify themselves as moderates, are not as distinct.  Partisanship and context matter for Republicans, who 
were more supportive of Perot in stronger Perot contexts in 1996 and in 1992, but they do not matter for 
Democrats, Independents, or those with No Preference/Other.   
 
5
 This also speaks directly to the argument that Nader was the “viable” third party option in this election, 
and support for him could have serious electoral ramifications.  The same did not hold true for Pat 
Buchanan, who had name recognition but ran an extremely weak campaign.  Using Buchanan favorability 
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One potential criticism is that these findings could be attributed to campaigning in 
particular areas by Nader.  If Nader went to areas where Perot had done well, attempting 
to win over support in those areas, then potentially the theory of a subculture is somewhat 
confounded.  However, recent findings about the Nader campaign imply that this is not 
the case.  Burden (2005) found that Nader appeared in places where he could attract the 
largest crowd; he was not thinking strategically about the competitiveness of the state 
race. Perot and Anderson followed similar strategies in attracting a general campaign 
audience rather than focusing efforts (Burden 2005; West 1983). 
The next step is to determine whether these shifts affected vote choice.  To do so, 
it is necessary to predict a respondent’s potential vote choice at the time of the second 
survey sample used in this study.  A multinomial logistic regression model is estimated 
and presented in Table 3 with Bush as a baseline, and predicted probabilities of the 
outcomes are presented in Table 4, with common ideological-partisan combinations 
chosen for clear interpretation.6 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
As can be seen, Republican and Independent conservatives are more likely to vote 
for Nader in contexts where the third party subculture is strongest, and both groups 
                                                                                                                                                 
as a dependent variable, the results, presented in Table 3A and Figures 5A-8A in the Appendix, show no 
such drastic movements in Perot context on favorability as the election went on.  However, we do see a 
drop in Democratic and Republican support for Buchanan, in higher Perot contexts, in the later sample; 
Independents became much more favorable toward Buchanan in the second sample.  As for voting, the 
predicted probabilities in Table 4A show that Buchanan did not get the same boost from context as Nader 
did, except among conservative Independent voters. 
 
6
 The logit model was also estimated with Nader favorability as a predictor, with a similar pattern of results 
for the predicted probabilities (though stronger/weaker effects can be found depending on what value Nader 
favorability is set at).  Furthermore, using the combined Perot 1996, Perot 1992, and Anderson 1980 
context measure, the results are actually a bit stronger. 
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experience large shifts in their predicted vote choice from the weakest to strongest 
subculture.  Strong conservative Republicans have approximately the same, low 
probability of voting for Nader, regardless of context.  On the surface, this indicates that 
the relatively stable favorability rankings given to Nader by conservatives and moderates 
across subcultures are separate from the act of voting.  The subculture has a positive 
effect on the vote choices of these individuals. 
The same does not hold true for liberal Independents, liberal Democrats, and 
strong liberal Democrats, who become less likely to vote for Nader in strong subcultures.  
The drop among liberal Independents, liberal Democrats, and strong liberal Democrats is 
likely caused by the same reasons for the decrease in favorability in the second sample:  
being more aware of third parties and what support for third parties represents.  In a close 
election, liberals were less willing to cast votes for Nader if the election was close and 
Gore’s chances of victory could be affected.  In fact, in the strongest possible subculture, 
conservative Republicans and Independents had a higher probability of voting for Nader 
than any liberal group.  Still, the liberal groupings all had a higher average probability of 
voting for Nader.  Moderate Independents, as hypothesized, were essentially not affected 
by the subculture.   
This leads to three specific findings in regards to the third party subculture and 
voting for Nader.  First, conservatives are positively affected by a strong third party 
subculture when it comes to voting for a third party candidate who is an ideological 
opposite.  Second, liberals are negatively affected by a strong third party subculture when 
it comes to voting and candidate evaluations when the probability of harming an 
ideologically-similar candidate is high.  Third, moderates Independents, which is the 
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group that best approximates “true” independent political activity, are not affected by the 
subculture.    
What is perhaps most intriguing is that conservative Republicans and conservative 
Independents have a higher predicted probability of voting for Nader than liberal 
Democrats and strong liberal Democrats in a strong third party subculture though 
conservatives were only weakly affected by context in their favorability toward Nader.  
All else equal, one might still expect that liberals would be more likely to vote for a 
Green Party candidate than a conservative, even if the direction of the predicted 
probabilities remained the same across contexts (increasing probability for conservatives, 
decreasing for liberals, as the subculture becomes stronger).   Furthermore, liberals 
maintain a higher probability of voting for Nader in strong subcultures than conservatives 
do in weak subcultures, indicating an overall average probability of voting for Nader that 
is higher than that for conservatives.  
The likely reason for this increased probability in voting, and much weaker effect 
on Nader favorability, is that these groups correspond very closely to those who 
originally supported Ross Perot.  As Rapoport and Stone (2005) noted, a good portion of 
Perot voters went on to support Nader, and, at the very least, this contextual finding 
points toward the group most associated with the Perot movement.  This is additionally 
intriguing in light of findings by other researchers that link Nader support to support for 
John Anderson in 1980, and link Anderson support to Perot support (Allen and Brox 
2005).  While this chapter cannot provide this additional evidence, there is a distinct 
possibility that a core group of Independent and Republican self-identified conservative 
voters are more supportive, over time, of third parties and major independent candidates 
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in general, and that this group is even more supportive of such candidates when those 
around them also support them.  Though they do not necessarily rank a particular third 
party candidate higher, the history and experience of past third party voting can drive 
them to support a candidate that is not ideologically-aligned with them. 
 
Results for Predicting Perot Favorability and Buchanan Favorability and Voting 
 
 To test these findings on a broader sample, additional data on other third party 
candidates is needed.  The prime example of another prominent, modern third party 
presidential candidate is Ross Perot in both 1992, as an independent, and in 1996, as the 
Reform Party candidate.  However, the NAES did not begin until 2000, so the logical 
data set to use is the National Election Studies (NES) in both 1992 and 1996, which 
contain county-level identification for respondents.  The model specifications for the 
main predictors will match earlier models.  Context is measured as Perot 1992 and/or 
Anderson 1980 for Perot in 1996 and Anderson vote in 1980 for Perot in 1992. 
Partisanship in the NES has a category labeled No Preference/Other that was created by 
merging the two separate categories and ideology is split into a seven-point scale 
(extremely liberal/conservative, liberal/conservative, and slightly liberal/conservative).  
Interactions between ideology and partisanship with context were also created. 
 For control variables, sex, age, education, and race are carried over, though an 
ordinal measure of urban to rural is used instead of dummy variables.  It was created by 
rescaling the Census Belt Code question into urban, suburban, and rural.  As well, 
dummy variables for attention to the campaign and whether a respondent cares who wins 
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the election are also included (no attention to campaign/does not care who wins=1), along 
with the difference between the major party presidential candidates’ vote shares in a 
respondent’s state for that year. 
 One limitation to the NES data are that they are not conducted as a rolling cross-
sectional survey, so the temporal element of the NAES Nader models cannot be 
replicated.  However, the NES does provide one advantage, especially in 1996:  
respondents are asked who they voted for in the previous election year.  This allows for a 
thorough test of the effect of context on third party support after we control for those that 
voted for the same third party candidate in the previous election year. 
 Since this provides a substantial hurdle for the theory and hypothesis discussed 
earlier, the results from the 1996 NES data about Perot favorability are presented first in 
Table 1A.  The interactive effects of interest are provided in Figures 1A and 2A.  In 
Figure 1A, which displays ideology’s effect on Perot favorability in 1996 based on 
Perot’s 1992 county-vote, we can see that extremely conservative respondents became 
much more favorable to Perot in stronger subcultures and that extremely liberal 
respondents became less favorable in stronger Perot contexts.  Had the election between 
Clinton and Dole been competitive, the movements may have been different than those 
displayed; extremely conservative respondents in strong subcultures might have 
mimicked the earlier results for strong liberals and Nader and become less supportive.  
However, as Perot was generally viewed as conservative-leaning, and Dole was not a 
threat to win the election, Perot’s ability to win over support among staunch 
conservatives was affected by the subculture.  A similar pattern is evident in Figure 2A, 
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where the uncompetitive nature of the election pushed Republicans in strong subcultures 
to be more supportive of Perot than Republicans in weak subcultures by about 10 points. 
 When we move back to 1992 and his independent campaign, only Anderson’s 
county-level vote in 1980 is used.  Here, the findings for partisanship match closely with 
the 1996 results.  In Figure 4A, Republicans support Perot about 8 points higher on the 
favorability scale from the least to most supportive subcultures.   For ideology, the most 
extreme conservative and liberal respondents, once again, have the greatest reactions 
across subcultures.  However, unlike in 1996, the 1992 results in Figure 3A show that 
both ideological groups were more supportive of Perot in stronger subcultures than in 
weaker subcultures.  Extremely conservative respondents are 50 points higher on the 
favorability scale for Perot from the weakest to the strongest subcultures, and extremely 
liberal respondents are about 30 points higher.  This is countered by basic liberal 
respondents, who decrease their support across the range of subcultures by 15 points. 
 In general, these findings do help to confirm a few of the hypotheses.  Once again, 
ideological moderates and Independents, the groups most prone to support third party 
candidates, are unaffected by the subculture.  While Independents do tend to be those 
most consistent in high rankings of third party candidates, the movement in support 
across subcultures is less than the movements of partisans. Additionally, those with the 
most extreme ideologies continue to exhibit the greatest movements in support across 
subcultures, indicating that these groups are sensitive to the appeals of third party 
candidates, even after controlling for partisan identification.  The effect of partisanship 
across subcultures followed in hypothesized patterns, as Republicans were more 
favorable to Perot in stronger than in weaker subcultures. 
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 While the evidence provided shows once more that context matters in 
understanding third party support and voting, one could argue that the results only hold 
for the pre-eminent third party candidate in a given election year.  However, the 2000 
election featured former Republican presidential primary challenger Pat Buchanan, well-
known within conservative circles and among anti-free trade activists.  Though he was 
much less successful than Nader, the NAES kept Buchanan in its rolling-cross sectional 
survey.  This means that a favorability question was asked, and he was included as an 
explicit option in its potential vote choice question.  This allows me to test the effect of 
context on a third party candidate that was not the most prominent of such candidates in 
the election. 
 The expectations about what will happen are slightly different than for the other 
two candidates.  Unlike Perot and Nader, who never ran for president as the member of a 
political party, Buchanan had tried as a Republican and had been a relatively prominent 
member of the party.  Because of this past partisan attachment, I would expect 
partisanship, not ideology, to be more affected by the strength of the subculture when it 
comes to favorability. 
 Using the same models provided for Nader earlier, Table 3A shows the early and 
late election sample results, with the substantive interactions displayed in Figures 5A-8A.  
In Figures 5A and 7A, which correspond to the earlier and later samples, respectively, it 
is clear that ideological attachment across the strength of subculture weakly affects 
Buchanan favorability in both periods.  The relatively consistent findings are not 
surprising across time, as ideology was expected to have less of an effect in these models. 
The only perceptible change to note is that liberal identifiers in the later sample do 
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increase their favorability of Buchanan from the weakest to the strongest subcultures by 
about 10 points. 
 The most notable effects are, as expected, for partisanship.  In the early sample, 
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents were all more favorable toward Buchanan as 
the strength of the subculture increased.  The smallest effect was on Independents, and 
Republicans and Democrats each increased support by about 10 points from the weakest 
to strongest subcultures (though Republicans remained, overall, more supportive of 
Buchanan).  In the later sample, the results change.  In stronger subcultures, Republicans 
and Democrats alike drop in their favorability of Buchanan, though these drops are not as 
extreme as those found by ideology for Nader.  Apparently, the close election did affect 
partisan rankings of Buchanan, but since he was never viewed in the same “upsetter” 
light as Nader, the drops in favorability were not as large.  Interestingly, Independents in 
stronger subcultures actually increased their support for Buchanan by about 20 points 
from the weakest to the strongest subcultures.   
 This finding can be explained by looking at Table 4A, which shows predicted 
probabilities of voting for Buchanan by ideology and partisanship across contexts.  The 
probabilities are derived from the same vote choice model used for Nader in Table 3.  As 
can be seen, the increasing support in stronger subcultures for Buchanan among 
Independents carried over to the act of voting for Independents who were conservative or 
liberal, but not for moderate Independents.  For Buchanan, Independents were those most 
likely to vote for him, but this was only among those Independents with an ideological 
orientation in the strongest subcultures. 
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 Combining the results for Nader and Buchanan voting, the group that was the 
most likely to vote for both candidates in stronger subcultures were conservative 
Independents.  This provides additional evidence that self-identified conservative 
Independents may help to facilitate third party voting more so than other groups, as they 
are the most susceptible to changes in voting patterns by the strength of a subculture.   
 
Conclusions 
 
 The analysis presented points toward the existence of third party subcultures that 
can affect how individuals evaluate third party presidential candidates and how 
individuals vote for such candidates.  Across ideologies, favorability towards Ralph 
Nader changed based on the strength of a county’s third party subculture, as did the 
probability of voting for him.  As well, this effect changed over the course of the election 
cycle, so that the impact of the subculture was different in the month before Election Day 
than it was several months earlier. Additional evidence is presented that also shows how 
Perot (1996 and 1992) and Buchanan (2000) favorability were affected by the strength of 
a third party subculture.   
In the prominent cases of Perot and Nader, the most extreme ideologies showed 
the greatest reactions by context.  In 1992, the most liberal and conservative respondents 
were most favorable to Perot in stronger subcultures.  In 1996, the dynamic changed as 
the most liberal respondents favored Perot more than other groups, but less so in strong 
subcultures; the most conservative respondents were least favorable in weak subcultures 
but gained in favorability as the subculture became stronger.  In 2000, the strong liberals 
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and conservatives once again showed the greatest reactions, with the most conservative 
respondents being much less supportive of Nader in stronger subcultures and the most 
liberal respondents being clearly more supportive in stronger subcultures until the 
election neared.  Then, the most liberal respondents became much less favorable towards 
Nader, who became the potential election upsetter that would keep Gore from winning 
office. 
 These findings have important theoretical implications.  First, the theory of a third 
party subculture moves the literature beyond the belief that support for third parties is 
mainly a protest against the two major parties and the political system.  People’s views of 
third party candidates are shaped by the history of their geographic area, and the ability to 
be shaped by the geographic subculture is dependent largely on one’s ideological position 
and the ideology of the third party candidate.  Second, the findings show that even the 
effect of context is time-dependent and that the idea of a “wasted vote” or “wasted 
support” affects how people evaluate third candidates.  With a tight race between Bush 
and Gore going into the election, the group of strong liberal identifiers, who were the 
biggest supporters of Nader months before in strong third party subcultures, dropped their 
support dramatically.  Such drops in support are typically framed as being caused by 
individuals without reference to the context individuals live in, yet the results clearly 
show that context moderates perceptions of third party candidate approval (and voting).  
Third, the use of favorability scales provides an alternative to using vote choice as a way 
of assessing a contextual effect on political behavior.  Indeed, the use of favorability 
scales along with voting provides a more thorough picture of how context can affect 
behavior in regards to a subculture.   
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 The findings also have practical implications that could be beneficial to future 
third party and independent candidates.  While there are many impediments to third party 
and independent candidacies, a separate but related problem is understanding where to 
target resources and which voters to target.  This study provides new insights into this 
matter by showing what individuals a candidate might want to attract to his campaign and 
in what contexts these individuals reside.  Though the findings presented focus on 
presidential campaigns, these findings could still be informative to third party candidates 
in statewide elections who could use available data and conduct similar analyses. 
 Future studies need to build upon this framework of a subcultural, contextual 
effect on third party support.  For instance, did those areas that voted for Perot, in high 
numbers, in 1992 and 1996 (and Anderson in 1980) also lend more support to third party 
candidates for state-level office, or is this effect uniquely national?  Were the success 
stories of Jesse Ventura in Minnesota and Angus King in Maine, and the strong showing 
by Thomas Golisano in New York, backed by supporters from local contexts that had 
also been more supportive of third party presidential candidates like Perot or John 
Anderson?  In light of the findings in this article, such studies could provide further 
evidence that areas have developed a more or less supportive subculture that affects how 
individuals evaluate and vote for third party candidates. 
 Even though the context being studied is not a specific area, but the percentage of 
the vote in a county one resides in, the results lend credence to the idea that an area's past 
support for a third party candidate can affect individual evaluations of third party 
candidates in the future and affect vote choice.  Past studies that have searched for an 
“alternative culture” were flawed by a.) focusing solely on individual-level attributes 
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without reference to a narrow electoral environment (in this case, the county) and b.) 
failing to look outside the act of voting for a contextual effect.  Therefore, this study 
breaks new theoretical ground and provides evidence that the concept of a third party 
subculture is credible, influencing individuals and their views on third party candidates at 
the national level. 
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Table 1:  Predicting Nader Favorability, Baseline Models 
Predictors NAES Rolling 
Cross-Section, 
1999-April 
2000 (Perot 
1996 Context)  
NAES Rolling 
Cross Section, 
1999-2000 
(Both Perot 
Elections and 
Anderson 
Context) 
NAES Rolling 
Cross-Section, 
Last Month 
Before Election  
(Perot 1996 
Context) 
NAES Rolling 
Cross-Section, 
Last Month 
Before Election 
(Both Perot 
Elections and 
Anderson 
Context) 
Perot’s 1996  
County Vote 
(Percentage) 
 
.06 (.20) .12 (.15) .14 (.15) .30 (.12)* 
Democrats 
 
7.56 (1.51)** 7.57 (1.51)** 4.59 (1.10)** 4.58 (1.10)** 
Independents 
 
8.36 (1.39)** 8.36 (1.39)** 6.11 (1.02)** 6.06 (1.02)** 
Conservative 
Ideology 
 
3.94 (2.16) 3.96 (2.16) 5.47 (1.62)** 5.34 (1.62)** 
Moderate 
Ideology 
 
7.90 (2.20)** 7.90 (2.20)** 11.11 (1.66)** 10.98 (1.66)** 
Liberal 
Ideology 
 
13.70 (2.44)** 13.67 (2.44)** 17.45 (1.83)** 17.27 (1.83)** 
Strong Liberal 
Ideology 
 
21.02 (3.34)** 21.02 (3.34)** 27.35 (2.56)** 27.13 (2.56)** 
Sex (Men=1) 
 
6.44 (1.09)** 6.43 (1.09)** -1.72 (.78)* -1.74 (.78)* 
Age 
 
-.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) -.03 (.03) -.03 (.03) 
Race (White=1) 
 
-.98 (1.70) -1.12 (1.70) 1.58 (1.43) 1.15 (1.43) 
Education 
 
1.12 (.25)** 1.11 (.25)** 1.25 (.18)** 1.23 (.18)** 
Suburban 
 
.98 (1.41) .86 (1.34) -.97 (.93) -1.11 (.92) 
Rural 
 
.66 (1.66) .55 (1.53) -3.32 (1.22)** -3.18 (1.12)** 
Interest in 
Government 
 
1.52 (.65)* -1.50 (.65)* .52 (.50) .50 (.49) 
Care Who Wins 1.53 (1.25) -1.51 (1.25) 1.36 (1.00) 1.26 (1.00) 
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Elections 
 
Margin 
Between Major 
Parties in 2000 
 
--- --- .05 (.04) .05 (.04) 
Constant 32.79 (4.27)**  32.06 (4.11)** 26.36 (3.10)** 25.00 (3.10)** 
 
  
 
N=2408 
Adjusted R-
Sq.=.0966 
F=18.17 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=2408 
Adjusted R-
Sq.=.0968 
F=18.20 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=4866 
Adjusted R-
Sq.=.0887 
F=30.60 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=4866 
Adjusted R-
Sq.=.0896 
F=30.93 
Prob.>F=.0000 
Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.  Two-
tailed tests.  **p<.01; *p<.0
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Table 2:  Predicting Nader Favorability with Early and Late Election Year Samples, with Various Contextual Measures 
Predictors Perot 1996, 
1999-April 2000 
Perot 1996, 
Oct.-Nov. 2000 
Perot 
1992/1996, 
1999-April 2000 
Perot 
1992/1996, Oct.-
Nov. 2000 
Anderson 1980 
and Perot 
1992/1996, 
1999-April 2000 
Anderson 1980 
and Perot 
1992/1996, Oct.-
Nov. 2000 
Context 
(Percentage) 
 
-1.28 (.68) -.17 (.51) -1.19 (.49)* -.19 (.38) -1.39 (.63)* -.46 (.47) 
Democrat  
 
13.26 (4.59)** 7.47 (3.30)* 9.18 (5.35)* 4.86 (3.83) 9.21 (5.61) 1.21 (3.91) 
Independent  
 
17.19 (4.15)** 5.14 (3.10) 13.22 (4.86)** 4.08 (3.69) 10.15 (5.04)* 1.90 (3.74) 
Conservative 
Ideology 
 
-12.28 (6.96) -1.7 (5.04) -14.97 (7.97) -1.17 (6.02) -13.74 (8.22) -3.47 (5.88) 
Moderate 
Ideology 
 
-8.01 (6.97) 7.85 (5.09) -11.33 (8.00) 7.06 (6.06) -9.70 (8.27) 4.95 (5.94) 
Liberal Ideology  
 
-12.88 (7.64) 16.57 (5.56)** -17.51 (8.81)* 15.44 (6.57)* -16.18 (9.24) 11.77 (6.56) 
Strong Liberal 
Ideology 
 
-7.21 (11.13) 36.35 (7.50)** -4.62 (12.13) 37.33 (8.74)** 1.25 (12.50) 34.79 (9.22)** 
Democrat x 
Context 
 
-.65 (.50) -.36 (.36) -.11 (.37) -.03 (.27) -.15 (.47) .30 (.33) 
Independent x 
Context 
 
-1.03 (.45)* .11 (.34) -.35 (.33) .14 (.25) -.17 (.42) .37 (.32) 
Conservative x 
Context 
1.82 (.74)** .84 (.55) 1.30 (.53)* 
 
.48 (.42) 
 
1.52 (.68)* 
 
.81 (.52) 
 
  
 36 
 
Moderate x 
Context 
 
1.77 (.75)* .39 (.56) 1.32 (.53)* .30 (.42) 1.52 (.69)* .56 (.52) 
Liberal x 
Context 
 
3.05 (.82)** .09 (.62) 2.20 (.59)** .15 (.46) 2.59 (.77)** .51 (.58) 
Strong Liberal x 
Context 
 
3.30 (1.30)** -1.19 (.87) 1.80 (.86)* -.78 (.63) 1.71 (1.07) -.66 (.80) 
Sex (Men=1) 
 
6.40 (1.09)** -1.69 (.78)* 6.42 (1.09)** -1.72 (.78)* 6.46 (1.09)** -1.70 (.78)* 
Age 
 
-.02 (.04) -.03 (.03) -.02 (.04) -.03 (.03) -.02 (.04) -.03 (.03) 
Education 
 
1.10 (.25)** 1.25 (.18)** 1.09 (.25)** 1.24 (.18)** 1.08 (.25)** 1.24 (.18)** 
Race (White=1) 
 
-.83 (1.70) 1.86 (1.45) -.93 (1.72) 1.58 (1.46) -1.04 (1.72) .94 (1.46) 
Suburban 
 
.93 (1.41) -.78 (.93) 1.00 (1.35) -.83 (.93) 1.04 (1.34) -1.04 (.92) 
Rural 
 
.74 (1.66) -3.26 (1.22)** .65 (1.56) -3.12 (1.15)** .70 (1.54) -3.12 (1.12)** 
Interest in 
Government 
 
1.44 (.65)* .55 (.49) 1.40 (.65)* .52 (.50) 1.43 (.65)* .50 (.49) 
Cares Who Wins 
Election 
 
1.56 (1.25) 1.34 (1.00) 1.57 (1.25) 1.28 (1.00) 1.55 (1.25) 1.18 (1.00) 
Margin Between 
Major Parties in 
2000 
--- .05 (.04) --- .04 (.04) --- .04 (.04) 
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 Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests.  **p<.01; *p<.05
 
Constant 44.98 (7.20)** 28.46 (5.27)** 50.74 (7.98)** 30.08 (6.00)** 49.73 (8.15)** 33.37 (5.87)** 
  
N=2,408 
Adjusted R-
Sq.=.1015 
F=13.94 
Prob.>F= .0000 
 
N=4,866 
Adjusted R-
Sq.=.0905 
F=23.00 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=2,408 
Adjusted R-Sq.=  
.1005 
F=13.80 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=4,866 
Adjusted R-Sq.= 
.0892 
F=22.67 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=2,408 
Adjusted R-Sq.= 
.0991 
F=13.60 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=4,866 
Adjusted R-Sq.=  
.0900 
F=22.86 
Prob.>F=.0000 
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Figure 1:  Ideology's Effect on Nader Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
 
Source:  NAES Cross-Section, December 1999-April 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 39 
 
 
  
 
40
45
50
55
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
V
al
u
es
 
o
f N
ad
er
 
Fa
v
o
ra
bi
lit
y
0 5 10 15 20
Perot's County Vote in 1996 By Percentage
 Democrat  Republican 
 Independent 
Figure 2:  Partisanship's Effect on Nader Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
 
Source:  NAES Cross-Section, December 1999-April 2000 
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Figure 3:  Ideology's Effect on Nader Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
 
 
Source:  NAES Cross-Section, October 2000 to Election Day 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
 
 
  
 
40
45
50
55
60
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
V
al
u
es
 
o
f N
ad
er
 
Fa
v
o
ra
bi
lit
y
0 5 10 15 20
Perot's County Vote in 1996 By Percentage
 Democrat  Republican 
 Independent 
Figure 4:  Partisanship's Effect on Nader Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
 
Source:  NAES Cross-Section, October 2000 to Election Day 2000 
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Table 3:  Predicting Vote Choice in 2000, with Bush as the Baseline 
Predictors Nader/Bush Buchanan/Bush Gore/Bush 
Context (Percentage) 
 
.03 (.13) .07 (.14) .07 (.09) 
Democrat  
 
3.27 (.66)** 3.00 (1.19)* 4.59 (.44)** 
Independent 
  
2.58 (.56)** .78 (1.00) 2.75 (.38)** 
Conservative Ideology 
 
-2.02 (1.19) .13 (1.38) .38 (.80) 
Moderate Ideology 
 
.57 (1.11) .77 (1.45) 1.96 (.78)* 
Liberal Ideology  
 
2.52 (1.16)* .60 (1.68) 3.03 (.84)** 
Strong Liberal Ideology 
 
3.44 (1.42)* 3.04 (2.48) 3.08 
(1.15)** 
Democrat x Context 
 
-.12 (.07) -.15 (.13) -.07 (.05) 
Independent x Context 
 
-.10 (.06) .07 (.10) -.08 (.04) 
Conservative x Context .19 (.13) -.03 (.14) -.02 (.09) 
 
Moderate x Context 
 
.06 (.13) -.14 (.15) -.02 (.08) 
Liberal x Context 
 
-.01 (.13) -.02 (.17) -.03 (.09) 
Strong Liberal x Context 
 
-.06 (.16) -.30 (.29) -.07 (.13) 
Sex (Men=1) 
 
.14 (.13) .60 (.27)* -.34 (.09)** 
Age 
 
.004 (.005) .003 (.009) .02 (.003) 
Education 
 
.03 (.03) -.17 (.06)** -.01 (.02) 
Race (White=1) 
 
-.65 (.32)* -1.41 (.47)** -1.70 
(.22)** 
Suburban 
 
-.34 (.16)* .28 (.37) -.26 (.11)* 
Rural 
 
-.56 (.21)** .71 (.41) -.29 (.15)* 
Interest in Government 
 
.03 (.08) .52 (.14)** -.04 (.06) 
Cares Who Wins Election 
 
.63 (.15)** .28 (.29) .08 (.11) 
Margin Between Major Parties -.01 (.01) .001 (.01) -.004 (.005) 
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Multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Two-
tailed tests.  Other/Bush category was estimated, but results depressed due to estimation 
issues (only 19 cases).  **p<.01; *p<.05.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in 2000 
Constant -3.84 (1.21)** -4.55 (1.56)** -2.83 
(.85)** 
 
 
N=4,569 
Pseudo R-
Sq.=.3630 
LR Chi-
Sq.=3312.51 
Prob.>Chi-Sq.= 
.0000 
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Table 4:  Predicted Probabilities of Nader Vote Choice, by Ideology and Partisanship, Across Contexts 
 
Predicted probabilities generated using CLARIFY (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001).  All other control variables are set to mean or 
median values except for the suburban and rural dummies, with suburban=1 and rural=0. 
 
 
 
Scenarios Strong 
Conservative 
Republican 
Conservative 
Republican 
Conservative 
Independent 
Moderate 
Independent 
Liberal 
Independent 
Liberal 
Democrat 
Strong 
Liberal 
Democrat 
Suburban, Minimum 
Context 
 
1.8% .3% 2.3% 12.2% 30.4% 14.4% 25.1% 
Suburban, Mean Context 
 
1.6% 1.1% 4.9% 11.9% 23.4% 9.7% 18.8% 
Suburban, Maximum 
Context 
 
4.8% 14.1% 17.6% 11.3% 10.4% 5.0% 10.0% 
∆ Min-Max +3.0% 
 
 
+13.8% +15.3% -.9% -20.0% -9.4% -15.1% 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
WHY THIRD PARTIES IN THE 1800S?  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD-PARTY VOTING IN VERMONT 
 
The literature on the role of third parties in American politics has often taken a 
historical approach.  Third parties were more prominent during the 1800s and early 
1900s, receiving higher vote totals and winning offices at rates than modern third parties.  
In Rosenstone et al.'s classic book, Third Parties in America, the authors used vote totals 
and records dating back to 1840 to help support their theories on third party voting and 
minor party candidate mobilization (1996 [1984]).  They note that third parties tend to 
arise when a significant policy issue is not being addressed by the major parties and when 
there are voters willing to vote against the major parties (Rosenstone et al. 1996).  
Recently, Hirano and Snyder (2007) used historical evidence to present reasons for the 
decline in third party voting since the late 1800s.  They argued that anti-fusion laws, 
changes to the Australian ballot in the South, direct primaries, and co-optation of policy 
goals, especially by the Democrats, were prime reasons for the decline in third party 
voting.  
In this paper, I attempt to build on these past findings by looking into the factors 
behind higher levels of third party voting in the 1800s.  I develop and test a theory of 
third party support that is based on the ability of third parties to develop and maintain 
support in specific geographically-based contexts. I argue that this development was 
aided by winning over “opinion leaders” in an area, which then allowed the party 
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message to spread to neighboring areas, and by specific social and institutional factors 
that advantaged third parties of this time period. To test this theory, I conduct an 
empirical case study of Vermont during the 1840s-1850s.  I examine the rise of the 
Liberty Party, a third party formed to push for the abolition of slavery, and its transition 
into the Free Soil Party, which took a more moderate approach to stopping slavery’s 
expansion.   
Using town-level voting records for annual state gubernatorial elections, I present 
evidence that the Liberty Party in Vermont was formed through the development of 
geographically-based support, which started by winning over support in more educated 
towns.  I then present evidence that these support bases then helped to spread Liberty 
Party voting to surrounding areas and that they remained areas of strong Free Soil Party 
voting into the early 1850s.  These findings provide scholars with new insights into how 
third parties were able to successfully contest elections during the early 1800s, thus 
adding to our knowledge of third parties and party development. 
 
Development of a Third Party 
 
 The goal of this article is to uncover how third parties were able to receive 
relatively high percentages of the vote during the 1800s.  My argument is that such 
support developed through geographically-based social relationships, which created areas 
that were more supportive of third parties.  The idea that geographically-based social 
relationships would affect political behavior is not unique, as the impact of such social 
relationships on political behavior has been found by numerous scholars (Lazarsfeld et al. 
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1948; Berelson et al. 1954; Putnam 1966; Huckfeldt 1979, 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1987).   
 The important question is why geographically-based social influence would play a 
significant role in the development of third parties in the 1800s.  I argue that there are 
several reasons.  First, mobility in the 1840s, which is the time period studied in this 
article, was limited.  While people did move, as America was a growing nation, most 
people tended to live and work within a limited region.  Railroads were not as popular as 
they would become, and the “mass media” as we know it was in its infant stages.  This 
put an emphasis on town life, and the influence of the town on one's political activities 
was quite strong. 
 Second, the electorate was much smaller, in terms of overall population and 
because the right to vote was typically granted only to white male citizens.  Once a 
political party had established itself and decided to run candidates, it had to appeal only 
to this segment of the population.  Winning the support of one or two individuals in a 
town could help to alter political outcomes, especially since populations were small by 
today’s standards. 
 Winning over town support likely occurred early on in the most educated towns, 
where there were more politically interested individuals that could potentially serve as 
“opinion leaders” and influence others in the community (see Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Katz 
and Lazarsfeld 1955; Kingdon 1970; Black 1982; Roch 2005).  Gaining political 
information required some level of education, or at least communities with more 
educated residents, since learning during this time period was based largely on oral 
transmission, reading newspapers/pamphlets, the ability to write letters to discuss politics 
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and learn about political trends, and time to spend on politics. Towns with a more 
educated populace, then, would have a greater probability of being more receptive to a 
third party and spreading information about the party locally.  
 Since this was an era where parties sent clear partisan signals to voters (Silbey 
1984), educated towns could serve as bases from which to articulate a clearer party 
message and formulate a plan of action.  To borrow from Sinclair (2006), the educated 
towns would be more likely to contain “intellectual elites.”  While Sinclair was 
describing Republicans during the 1970s and 1980s who had to adopt certain policy 
views before others in the party would deem these views as legitimate, the same could be 
said for opinion leaders in a community.  Until a trusted elite or elites in the community 
spurs the support and development of the party, few will support it. 
Third parties also benefited from advantageous electoral arrangements to help 
spread the party agenda.  Electoral laws in many states established short terms in office, 
with elections being held in some states every year (including Vermont).  With a constant 
electoral stimulus, elections gave third parties an opportunity to remind the voting public 
that they were active and what their “brand” was (see Downs 1957 about a party brand).7   
 This constant electoral stimulus would also reduce the risk involved in a “wasted 
vote,” a reason often cited for why modern third parties are unsuccessful (Ferguson and 
Lowi 2001; De Maio et al. 1983). Yearly elections reduce the possible risk in voting for a 
party with little experience in office.  If a third party candidate won and was a poor 
politician, she could be removed from office within a year.  Thus, the risk of “wasting” a 
vote is reduced somewhat during these shorter terms.  
                                                 
7
 Historical evidence shows that these minor parties acted just like their major party rivals when it came to 
campaigning, platforms, and mobilizing voters.  As Silbey (1991) wrote, “In each case, they emulated their 
enemies.” 
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  To summarize, I argue that the lack of mobility and mass media, the small size of 
the electorate, the constant electoral stimulus, and the reduction of the “wasted vote” 
syndrome created an environment where a third party could develop stable bases of 
support from election-to-election.  Once a third party was able to win over support in 
more educated towns, then these towns served as support bases, helping to increase vote 
totals and spread the party message.  Since other voters were part of local discussion 
networks that involved individuals from these towns, some people were attracted to 
voting for a third party after seeing others support its candidates.  Elections were “an 
opportunity for communities to express themselves…and to affirm their communal 
commitments” (Silbey 1983). This took time to develop, but the result was a context that 
was more supportive of third parties and willing to vote outside the two main party 
options. It is my argument that in this era and electoral environment, third parties were 
advantaged at the state-level and that support developed within geographically-distinct 
units.    
 
Reasons for Studying Vermont 
 
 To test this theory about the development of third parties, I argue that the town-
level in Vermont during the 1840s and early 1850s can be used.  Familiarity with the 
political context of Vermont during this time period is low, and this section provides 
reasons for using the Vermont case combined with a brief overview of the state’s party 
system.  
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The first reason is that the period from 1840-1855 saw the emergence of the anti-
slavery Liberty Party (1841-1845), which was replaced within one year's time by the less 
radical Free Soil Party (1846-1854), which moderated its views on slavery and contained 
the pragmatic wing of the old Liberty Party  (Sewell 1976).  In other words, there was 
third party voting that can be studied in the state.     
Second, towns were the main unit of local governance, containing rural farmland 
and, at times, concentrated centers of population.  These concentrated areas of settled 
populations could be incorporated as villages within the town boundaries, and this 
practice was most prominent in New England in Vermont (Bates, 1912).  However, the 
race to incorporate villages and cities did not take off in the state until 1870; only eight 
villages were incorporated prior to 1850, with four more being incorporated between 
1850-1859 (Howe 2005).  This makes the town the relevant political unit of local 
governance, especially since the Vermont town hall meeting is, even today, a vital part of 
the state’s identity (see Bryan 2004).8        
More support for this reason is given in the historical account by R.L. Morrow, 
who noted that the Liberty Party sustained itself in its early years through lecturers who 
went from town to town with the party message.  It was not until 1844 that the lecture 
circuit was stopped and the activists worked on establishing county and town committees, 
as well as establishing the Green Mountain Freeman, the party’s official newspaper 
(Morrow 1929).9   
                                                 
8
 The town was the level used to record election results, further indicating the relevance of this geographic 
and governmental unit. 
 
9
 Data on where the specific committees formed, to my knowledge, is not available in any form. 
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 The third reason for focusing on Vermont is that the Liberty and Free Soil Parties 
in Vermont had to thrive in an environment where the Whig Party of the state was, to a 
large degree, anti-slavery.  As Holt points out in his work on the history of the Whig 
Party, the Vermont Whig Congressmen would staunchly oppose the Compromise of 1850 
and the Whig Party’s President Fillmore, further solidifying the strength of the party in 
the state (Holt 1999).  More evidence of Vermont Whigs’ anti-slavery positions can be 
observed from Congressional members from the state opposing gag rules in the House in 
the late 1830s-early 1840s (McPherson 1963) and in inaugural speeches made by newly-
elected Whig governors who portrayed Vermont’s generally anti-slavery ideology in a 
positive light (State Archives of Vermont Online).  In the face of a strong anti-slavery 
element in the Whig Party of Vermont, the Liberty Party faced an obstacle in developing 
a consistent support base in the population.10   
 This is not to say that the Democratic Party was weak.  Though the Whigs were 
the dominant party in the state, winning all gubernatorial elections from 1840-1852, the 
state was a competitive partisan environment. During the Liberty Party years from 1841-
1845, the Democrats received between and 38.2% and 45.2% of the yearly gubernatorial 
vote even when the Liberty Party was receiving above 10% of the vote and the Whigs 
polled in the mid-40% to just over 50% range.   This added up to a significant number of 
state representatives for the Democrats, since each town had one representative.  The 
Democrats also retained one of the four House districts throughout the 1840s. While the 
political system heavily favored the anti-slavery Whig Party of Vermont, the Democratic 
Party was still a viable political party that the Liberty and Free Soil Parties had to contest. 
                                                 
10
 Finally, Vermont is used because accurate town-level voting data is available for the state. 
 52 
 
 
  
A fourth reason for using Vermont is that the Liberty Party shifted into the Free 
Soil Party starting in 1846 and survived the movement of Democrats into the party 
organization from 1849-1851, both significant hurdles to maintaining party support.  The 
Free Soil Party took on a less radical orientation than the Liberty Party, attracting 
Democratic voters with the nomination of former President Martin Van Buren as its 
presidential candidate in 1848.  In Vermont, this election led to a coalition known as the 
Free Soil Democrats, who ran candidates until 1854, but was only “successful” as the 
second major party through the election of 1851, when the Democrats began to reassert 
themselves as a separate political entity.  The Free Soil Party remained the Free Soil 
Democrats after the departure of most of the true Democratic identifiers, though I will 
refer to this organization as the Free Soil Party to avoid confusion.  In 1852 and 1853, the 
Free Soil Party continued to win elected office in the state without the need for 
Democratic support.  1854 was the last election for the Free Soil Party in the state, with 
the remnants moving back to one of the two major parties.11  With these reasons and 
history in mind, the next step is to develop hypotheses about how the theory provided 
earlier will be applied to the study of party development in Vermont during the 1840s.     
        
Hypotheses about the Development of Liberty Party Voting  
  
The foremost concern of this study is explaining whether the Liberty Party in 
Vermont developed geographic-support bases and what advantaged the party in 
                                                 
11
 The last election of importance to the Free Soilers came in 1853, when elected Free Soil representatives 
in the statehouse supported the Democratic candidate for governor in exchange for the Speaker of the 
House position after a clear majority could not be obtained over two elections.  This maneuver was not 
supported by Free Soil voters and non-elected Free Soil candidates, who then began to support  the 
Republican Party in 1854(FairVote.org; Markowitz, n.d.). 
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developing in particular towns.  The first hypothesis, and the first step in this 
developmental process, is that the Liberty Party vote by town will increase as the level of 
a town’s education increases.  Educated towns are, as noted earlier, more likely to contain 
a potential opinion leader who could either join the party or, at the very least, bring the 
topic to the attention of others in the town.  Through either mechanism, the Liberty Party 
could begin to establish itself initially in a few towns with a more educated population. 
This hypothesis has support in the writings from the Green Mountain Freeman, 
even if the paper was published three years after the initial development of the party.  In a 
resolution passed by the Orange County Party Convetion in 1844, it was stated that “…it 
is the duty of every lover of universal freedom to exert his influence in private circles, 
public assemblies, and at that ballot box…” (Orange County Convention, June 28th 
1844).  These sentiments were surely held prior to a formal party organization, and those 
who took the cause to heart likely helped in dispensing party writings and spreading the 
party message.   
The second hypothesis is that the Liberty Party vote by town will increase as the 
percentage of the vote for the Liberty Party in the previous election increases.  Though 
this is empirically an autoregressive relationship, it is crucial to the argument of this 
article, as it indicates that voting for the third party was not the product of shifting 
support across towns that was unrelated from election to election.  Instead, strong bases 
of Liberty Party voting developed and were maintained across election cycles.    
 The third hypothesis is that the Liberty Party vote by town will increase as the 
percentage of the vote for the Liberty Party in neighboring towns, in the previous 
election, increases. In other words, this hypothesis tests for a basic spatial relationship.  
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Towns are influenced by the behavior of neighboring towns, as people within these 
communities are more likely to communicate on a regular basis and influence each 
other’s political behaviors.  However, due to historical circumstances, it is likely that this 
geographic dependence is not the same across elections.  It is likely weakest for the 
period starting in 1842 with the poor showing for the Liberty Party until 1844, when the 
party began to mirror the major parties through the establishment of party organizations 
in towns and starting its own newspaper in the state.12   
 The Green Mountain Freeman contains direct evidence that the formation of 
party organizations was intended to facilitate this spread.  County committees were 
encouraged to put papers and tracts “into the hands of such men in each town as will 
circulate them to every nook and corner of their town” (Green Mountain Freeman, Jan. 
24th 1845).  Additionally, county and town committees were urged to “obtain bundles of 
papers to circulate in those places where our principles are not fully understood, and have 
not obtained a footing…as in no other way can the same amount of light be brought 
directly before the minds of the people” (Green Mountain Freeman, April 4th 1845).   
 A related expectation is that Liberty Party support bases will carry over into the 
Free Soil Party and survive the tumultuous party movements that occurred between 1848 
and 1851, when Democrats temporarily shifted into the Free Soil Party to support Martin 
Van Buren.  I hypothesize that towns where the Liberty Party developed the strongest 
support bases in the early- to mid-1840s will also be strong supporters of the Free Soil 
                                                 
12
 One could argue that the relationship should be strongest prior to the development of a formal party 
organization.  When word of mouth was used to spread support, neighboring towns would likely be the 
most influenced.  This is a viable alternative explanation, but I argue that the development of a formal party 
structure enhanced the localized spread of the Liberty Party beyond what word of mouth could provide.  
With a structured approach to disseminating the party message, it should lead to higher percentages of 
Liberty Party voting in a town as neighboring towns increase their voting.  
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Party in 1852 and 1853, after the Democratic Party reasserted itself and former 
Democratic identifiers returned to the major party.  Finding support for this hypothesis 
would show that the Liberty Party was able to develop strong bases committed to voting 
for parties that opposed the expansion and entrenchment of slavery, leading to higher 
levels of third party voting over the course of this political era. 
 Together, these hypotheses can help to advance knowledge about third parties and 
why they were more successful in the 1800s than they are today.  By showing that voting 
for the Liberty Party was the product of developing support bases in certain towns, that 
this voting was also the product of neighboring towns exhibiting higher levels of Liberty 
voting, and showing that party support remained strong even after the movement of 
members into the Free Soil Party, scholars will have a better idea of why the parties of 
this time period were able to win significant shares of the vote and maintain this over 
election cycles.  Evidence that towns where the Liberty Party performed well continued 
to be areas of Free Soil support in 1852 and 1853 provides even stronger support for the 
notion that third parties could develop and maintain stable voting blocs.  This helps add 
to the story of higher levels of third party voting in the 1800s, a recurring point made by 
major third party research (Rosenstone et al. 1996; Hirano and Snyder 2007). 
Still, it is possible that there are other reasons behind the higher levels of third 
party voting in Vermont at this time.  This means that a number of factors need to be 
considered that could affect the expectations and provide different reasons for the 
development, maintenance, and diffusion of Liberty and Free Soil voting.  Instead of 
voting being the product of bases of support, the third parties could have been receiving 
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more votes because of factors unrelated to the presence of opinion leaders, previous party 
voting, or the behavior of neighboring towns.  
The first such consideration is that the Liberty Party could have been the product 
of winning over voters in occupations which tended to be either Whig or Democratic. 
Traditionally, Democrats are viewed as being the party of agriculture and the 
Whigs/Federalists are viewed as the party of those involved in the manufacturing and 
distribution of marketable goods.  It is possible that the Liberty Party, being the anti-
slavery party, would perform better in the areas with more industry and worse in heavily 
agricultural areas, as the Whigs in Vermont tended to be anti-slavery.  The opposite could 
also be true:  the Liberty Party could perform worse in the manufacturing areas if they are 
competing head-to-head with the Whigs for votes.  Either way, these possibilities need to 
be considered.  Second, the Liberty Party could have received more votes because of 
electorally-lopsided towns where only one major party was dominant.  This is because 
third parties often become attractive options for voters when only one major party has a 
viable chance for victory in a town, county, or state.  Since the Democrats and Whigs 
were more successful in certain parts of the state than in others, this could lead to 
incorrect conclusions about the maintenance and spread of Liberty voting if not 
controlled.  A third factor is the size of a town’s population.  It is possible that the Liberty 
Party was more successful in either very small or very large towns.  In the former, having 
a smaller population means less voters, so winning over one or two individuals could 
significantly affect the percentage of the Liberty Party vote in a town.  In the latter, large 
population towns might have an advantage in developing more opinion leaders because 
of the increasing size of the voting bloc.  Furthermore, town populations are not evenly 
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spread across the state.  Some areas of Vermont were more rural than others, even if the 
state during this time period was essentially all rural by modern population standards.  
Population size, then, could affect arguments about the effect of neighboring towns noted 
earlier.  
 
Data Set 
 
 I obtained the data for this project from the State Archives of Vermont.  The 
dependent variables being used in the Liberty Party analyses are town-level vote 
percentages for the Liberty Party candidate for governor from 1841-1846 (elections were 
yearly), which bookends the first race for governor featuring the Liberty Party in 1841 
and the first race for governor featuring the Free Soil Party in 1846.  When it comes to 
determining whether Liberty Party support bases continued to support the Free Soil Party, 
data from 1852 and 1853 will be used.  These years represent the two successful elections 
for the Free Soil Party after the departure of the Democrats.  Additional town-level 
variables have also been added to the data set to control for localized factors that may 
have systematically affected third party voting.  All of these variables are available from 
the 1840 U.S. Census, which provides results by town. 
The first predictor is simply the percentage of the Liberty Party vote at t-1, which 
controls for the influence of past voting on current voting.  It is expected to be positive 
and significant in all models.  I also used election results to calculate the absolute value 
of the percentage difference between Whig and Democratic support by town, starting in 
1840, which serves to control for the level of major party competition.  Higher absolute 
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values indicate towns where the major parties are not competitive, thus increasing the 
probability that voters will cast their ballots for a third party that is unlikely to win votes 
in a close contest between Whigs and Democrats.13   
 I also generated the average percentage of the Liberty Party vote, for each town 
and in each year from 1841-1845, that combines all the percentages of the vote from 
bordering towns.  For example, if Town A is bordered by Towns B, C, D, E, and F, 
Towns B-F were averaged together.  This variable will help to determine whether town 
voting for the Liberty Party is affected by higher levels of voting in nearby towns in the 
previous election.  It is expected to have a positive effect, as stronger Liberty Party voting 
in neighboring towns at t-1 should lead to higher levels of Liberty Party voting in a 
particular town at time t if party support is spreading across town boundaries. 
 For measuring the level of education in a town, the best available measure in the 
1840 Census is the population of a town that is illiterate.  This is turned into a percentage 
of the total population that is literate, with higher values indicating a greater percentage 
of literate residents in a town.  While there is no way to directly test whether opinion 
leaders drive the growth in the vote at the town level, and help to spread the party 
message, this measure does allow me to test whether more educated towns were more 
receptive to the Liberty Party message and whether they served as initial support bases in 
the growth and spread of party support to other towns. 
The remaining controls mentioned in the previous section are measured using 
Census data. For occupational categories by town, the population employed in agriculture 
and the population employed in manufacturing and trade are used, representing 
                                                 
13
 For the vote totals, there were years when a town's results were either rejected or were not turned in.  
However, there are few cases of this, and the missing data does not appear to be caused by any systematic 
pattern/bias. 
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traditional areas of Democratic and Whig support, respectively.  These are converted into 
percentages of a town’s population involved in each occupational category.  The final 
control is the total population of a town.  Potentially, this could be positive or negative.  
Small population towns could have higher Liberty Party voting because winning over 
very small numbers of voters could significantly alter the town’s percentage Liberty vote.  
Likewise, towns with larger populations have more potential voters to be won over, so 
higher percentages of the vote could develop in these towns first. 
  
The Liberty Party, 1841-1845 
 
 The first step in analyzing the data is to establish whether town-level vote 
percentages for the Liberty Party are related to one another from year-to-year.  
Increasingly high correlations from year-to-year would indicate that particular towns 
consistently supported the Liberty Party. Though this would not indicate what factors 
predicted Liberty Party vote percentages, correlations would help to establish that towns 
did develop consistent groups of Liberty Party voters.  This follows analyses of third 
party vote totals in the 20th Century that rely on such techniques at the county- and state-
level to infer that there are areas more supportive of third parties across election cycles 
(see Allen and Brox 2005).   
 When examining the over time correlations in the Liberty Party vote in Vermont, 
I am interested in: a.) whether the Liberty Party developed voting bases in towns over the 
course of its existence and b.) whether the Liberty Party bases of support reached a level 
consistent with those of the major parties, meaning high year-to-year correlations similar 
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to those of the major parties.  Evidence that the Liberty Party developed stable voting 
bases would lend credence to the idea that the party was able to build and sustain support 
in some towns over several elections.  Furthermore, should the year-to-year correlations 
for Liberty Party votes reach levels that parallel year-to-year correlations for the Whigs 
and the Democrats, then I have evidence that the Liberty Party in 1840s Vermont was 
able to generate consistently strong support bases on par with its major party 
counterparts. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 The correlations are presented in Table 1.  Whig and Democratic Party 
correlations are high from year to year, ranging from .90 to .98. Between 1841-1842 and 
1842-1843, the Liberty Party correlations are .73 and .69, respectively.  This is fairly 
large, but clearly not on par with the Whigs and the Democrats.  By 1844-1845, this had 
changed, with a correlation of .93, which is much closer to the Whig and Democrat 
correlations. Also, between 1845 and 1846 (not shown in Table 1), when the Liberty 
Party shifted into the Free Soil Party, the correlation between votes by town was .93.   
This is evidence of  the stability of support bases being developed and maintained 
for the Liberty Party that were almost equivalent to those of the two major parties in 
strength.14  This supports the theoretical argument that third parties in the 1800s were 
able to develop bases of voters who would support their party from election-to-election.15  
                                                 
14
 The size of the bases was not equivalent.  On average, a town gave 46.36% of its vote to the Whigs 
(S.D.=18.77; min=0, max=100), 39.64% to the Democrats (S.D.=17.47; min=0, max=100), and 14% to the 
Liberty Party (S.D.=13.17; min=0, max=61.15)  in 1845. 
 
15
 The correlations also speak to research that argues that it takes three election cycles for a voting habit to 
develop (Butler and Stokes 1974; Franklin 2002), which appears to be the case for the Liberty Party in 
Vermont.  Statewide, there were towns where Liberty Party voting became a habit. 
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Readers should keep in mind that these are aggregate-level findings.  The results 
cannot speak to the average voter in each town and how they behaved in any one election 
or across elections; this would be committing the “fallacy of ecological inference” (see 
Kramer 1983). It is plausible to imply that some voters remained loyal to the Liberty 
Party, much like they did for the Whigs and Democrats; the correlations are quite high 
and the town populations were quite low by modern standards.  However, the main point 
about party development to glean from the preliminary analysis in Table 1 is that the 
Liberty Party appears to have developed and maintained support bases at the town-level.  
 
Predictive Model of Liberty Party Voting 
  
The correlations provide a good preliminary step in analyzing Liberty Party 
support, yet the correlations cannot test the hypotheses laid out earlier.  To do so, an 
empirical model needs to be specified.  I will utilize ordinary least squares regression 
models with the percentage of the Liberty Party vote, by town, as the dependent variable.  
There are 237 towns for most years, though voting returns for individual towns are 
sometimes missing from the original records.  The standard errors in these models will be 
clustered by the 14 counties in Vermont.  The independent variables are the town’s 
previous vote for the Liberty Party at t-1, the percent of the population that is literate, the 
town’s neighboring percentage of the vote for the Liberty Party at t-1, the town’s absolute 
difference in the major party vote for governor at t-1, overall population, percent of the 
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population involved in agriculture, and the percent of the population involved in 
manufacturing and trade.16 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 These models are displayed in Table 6, along with statewide Liberty or Free Soil 
vote percentages and fit statistics for each model.  First, the models for 1841 and 1842 
confirm some expectations about the formative years of the party, especially in regards to 
the proxy for opinion leadership.  As can be seen from the significant percent literate 
variable, voting for the Liberty Party increased in 1841 and 1842 as the percentage of 
literate residents in a town in 1840 increased.  This confirms expectations that, initially, 
the Liberty Party was relatively more successful in areas where the populace was more 
educated.  The percent literate is not significant from 1843-1846, but since the models 
account for past town voting, which itself was affected by the presence of a more 
educated public in establishing a voting base, this does not go against expectations. 17  
Second, all models show that past town voting for the Liberty Party helped predict the 
vote percentage for the party in the next election.  This supports the story described from 
the correlations in Table 1 and confirms my second hypothesis.   
Third, the variable measuring neighboring towns’ average percentage of the vote 
from the previous election is significant in the 1842, 1845, and 1846 models while not 
significant in the 1843 and 1844 models.  These findings comport with expectations.  The 
1842 election was a poor showing for the Liberty Party (3.9%), but the party did better in 
                                                 
16
 Tables 1B and 2B in the Appendix provide summary statistics for voting related variables and predictors 
derived from the Census.  Table 3B in the Appendix runs the same models without lagged values of Liberty 
Party voting and the average Liberty Party vote in neighboring towns. 
17
 In Table 3B in the Appendix, when lagged values of voting are not considered, the percent literate is also 
significant in 1843, with a larger coefficient than in 1842.  Thus, in the three years without a formal party 
organization, voting for the Liberty Party occurred at higher rates in towns with a more literate, educated 
populace. 
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towns that had neighbors who voted more highly for the party in 1841.  In the 1843 and 
1844 election models, past voting by neighboring towns had no significant effect, though 
Liberty Party voting increased throughout the state and the past town-level vote 
percentage remained significant (indicating within-town growth in support).  With the 
development of a formal party organization and newspaper in 1844, support was able to 
spread to neighboring towns, and towns in 1845 were more likely to vote in higher 
percentages for the Liberty Party if neighboring towns voted in higher percentages in 
1844.  This continued into 1846, when the Liberty Party changed into the Free Soil Party.  
 Fourth, the controls do not seem to offer any consistent alternative explanation for 
party growth. The absolute difference in the major party vote for governor in the last 
election is only significant and positive in 1841.  This indicates that Liberty Party voting 
was not just a product of electorally lopsided districts.  Instead, the Liberty Party had 
towns in which it was perceived to be electorally competitive or, at the very least, had a 
committed partisan base.  These features are rarely found in regards to 20th and 21st 
Century third parties. 
 There also does not appear to be any set pattern of intruding in on traditional 
Democratic or Whig bases of support.  The percent of the town involved in 
manufacturing and trade, which would represent traditional Whig strongholds, was not 
significant, and the percent of the town involved in agriculture, which would represent 
traditional Democratic strongholds, was negatively related to Liberty voting in 1842 but 
positively related in 1845.  Finally, town population is significant and positive in 1841 
and in 1846, but is not significant from 1842-1845 and negatively signed in 1843 and 
1844. 
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One critique that could be leveled against these findings is that the parties were 
tapping into an underlying opposition to slavery in these towns that is not measured.  The 
findings I present do not go against this interpretation of the results, but they do show that 
the initial support bases, and the spread of support, were built on winning over the most 
educated towns first and then moving the party message outward.   If there was a general 
sense of opposition to slavery in these areas, the party still had to spread the message and 
contest a state Whig Party that was, as mentioned earlier, decidedly anti-slavery in 
orientation to begin.   
 
Transition to the Free Soil Party/Free Soil Democrats 
 
The next step is to see how the transition from the Liberty to the Free Soil Party 
affected the support bases, and whether or not the towns that were strong Liberty Party 
supporters remained so with the new party organization.  In fact, one cannot assume that 
the Liberty Party support bases remained loyal once the Free Soil campaign of former 
Democratic President Martin Van Buren is taken into account.  Vote percentages 
skyrocket for the party in 1848 (29.6% for the gubernatorial vote) and more so in 1849-
1851 (with a high of 44% in 1849) as Democrats move into the party.  These increases 
correspond to the party’s name change from the Free Soil Party to the Free Soil 
Democrats, and the number of Democrats moving in obfuscates the underlying support 
base generated during the 1841-1846 period.   
Still, there are two years of moderate success for the Free Soil Democrats in 1852 
and 1853 in which its total percentages of the vote (19.6% and 17.5%, respectively) are 
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more comparable to the percentages of the vote the Liberty and Free Soil Parties obtained 
in the period from 1844-1846 (10.2%-14.6%).  Therefore, correlation analysis such as 
that used earlier in this work can help uncover whether town-level support in these earlier 
years was able to maintain itself through the tumultuous movements of the very late 
1840s-very early 1850s.  Framed as a question:  are the bases of support for the Liberty 
Party prior to 1848-1851 good indicators of support for the Free Soil Party once the 
Democrats move out of the party? 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 The correlation results are displayed in Table 7.  The two years after the 
Democrats had left the Free Soil organization (1852 and 1853) are both years in which 
Free Soil vote percentages are correlated at levels above .6 with Liberty Party voting in 
1844 and 1845.18  The correlations show that the movement of Democrats into the Free 
Soil Party, and their abandonment of the party after 1851, did not completely destroy the 
Free Soil’s traditional support bases that formed under the Liberty Party.  Thus, the third 
party voting bases that developed in particular towns during the Liberty Party years 
remained relatively strong after the move to the Free Soil Party. 
 
Geographically-Based Support from Liberty to Free Soil 
 
 The correlations presented in the previous section go only so far in explaining the 
maintenance of Liberty Party support as members moved into the Free Soil Party.  Earlier 
regression results do help to support these correlations, as they showed that there was a 
                                                 
18
 Correlations involving the Free Soil Party from 1849-1851 are quite low with 1846-1848 and 1852-1853.  
The correlations are typically around .15-.25, indicating that the party was gaining support outside the 
traditional areas of Free Soil support. 
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neighboring towns effect that influenced Liberty Party, and the first year of Free Soil 
Party, voting.  However, neither result can ensure that a.) the party’s message was able to 
diffuse from particular centers of party support that developed early on and b.) that these 
early bases of Liberty Party strength remained strong supporters for the Free Soil Party in 
the early 1850s.  Additional regression models like those in Table 6 for this later Free 
Soil period would also not be able to easily isolate whether the strongest groups of 
Liberty Party towns continued in their support, nor could they enable us to see any 
patterns of diffusing support.  To do this, spatial analysis, combined with mapping the 
results, provides an intuitive way of testing for diffusion and the maintenance of support. 
 I first utilize the program SaTScan™ (Kulldorff and Information Management 
Services, Inc. 2006) to identify where spatial “clusters” of Liberty Party voting 
developed.19  Originally designed to be used in the study of diseases, the program allows 
users to test whether clusters are randomly distributed over space, over time, or over 
space and time by utilizing scan statistics.  This is accomplished by the program 
“gradually scanning a window across time and/or space, noting the number of observed 
and expected observations inside the window at each location” (SaTScan™ User Guide, 
Version 7.0).    After running through a pre-determined number of simulations, the 
“window” with the maximum likelihood is considered the primary “cluster,” with other 
secondary clusters provided.  The primary cluster is “the cluster least likely to be due by 
chance,” with the secondary clusters also being less likely to be due by chance.  With 
these clusters come p-values, allowing the user to determine whether the null hypothesis 
of complete spatial randomness can be rejected (SaTScan™ User Guide, Version 7.0).   
                                                 
19
 SaTScan™ is a trademark of Martin Kulldorff. The SaTScan™ software was developed under the joint 
auspices of (i) Martin Kulldorff, (ii) the National Cancer Institute, and (iii) Farzad Mostashari of the New 
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. 
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 If significant clusters of Liberty Party voting exist, the significant clusters can 
then be mapped over levels of Liberty and Free Soil Party voting, by town, for selected 
years.  This mapping of the clusters will provide an intuitive way to see if the early 
clusters of Liberty Party voting, when mapped over Liberty and Free Soil vote 
percentages in later election cycles, overlap.  I can also check for localized diffusion this 
way, as we should see that voting for these parties spread to towns near the significant 
clusters and that the clusters generally remain concentrated areas of high-level Liberty 
and Free Soil Party support.  
 To test this in SaTScan™, a spatial analysis was conducted on the Liberty Party 
percentages of the vote in 1843, as 1843 signifies the start of high year-to-year vote 
correlations but is not part of the highest year-to-year correlation (see Table 1) (see 
Kulldorff 1997).20  The program ran 999 Monte Carlo simulations on the case data.  All 
significant clusters identified by the program at the p<.01 level were retained.21  As run, 
the spatial analysis allows for each town to be its own cluster and clusters cannot overlap 
one another.22 
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
 To best display the results, maps of Vermont were created using ArcGIS 9.0 that 
identify the 1843 spatial voting clusters over town-level voting percentages in later 
                                                 
20
 Using 1843 also provides a tougher test for the diffusion and maintenance of Liberty/Free Soil voting, as 
1843 was a year before the development of the Liberty Party’s formal party organization. 
 
21
 Towns within clusters were dropped if the program could not identify the number of observed/expected 
cases in which the town in question was a part of a “window” during the simulations that lead to the 
clusters.  This is part of the output provided by SaTScanTM.  Out of 38 cases, this occurred in 11 cases.  
Placing them on the maps as diamonds provides the same general result, and these maps are available from 
the author upon request. 
 
22
 A total of five clusters were significant at the p<.01 level.  One of the clusters was a single town (West 
Fairlee, located in the central-eastern part of Vermont).  
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election years.23  In Figure 5, the two maps show the significant 1843 clusters overlaid on 
1843 and 1845 Liberty Party vote percentages by town, with towns filled in with darker 
shades indicating higher percentages of the vote.  The towns in significant clusters are 
displayed with white diamonds placed within the geographic center of each town’s 
boundaries.    
We can observe that there was a tendency for Liberty Party voting to spread out 
from the significant clusters from 1843 to 1845.  Towns near clusters in 1843 increased to 
darker shades by 1845, showing an increase in Liberty Party voting.  This provides 
further evidence that the Liberty Party’s ability to form and maintain voting blocs was not 
merely a process of “winning over” specific, isolated towns.  Instead, the Liberty Party’s 
success hinged on expanding outward from earlier bases of support, lending additional 
support to the earlier empirical models that Liberty Party voting in a town was related to 
the voting of neighboring towns in earlier election years. 
[Insert Figure 6 Here] 
 The next step is to then identify whether these clusters continued to be areas of 
strength for the Free Soil Party.  A stringent test is to see whether the significant clusters 
of Liberty Party voting in 1843 continue to be areas of strong Free Soil support in the 
years 1852 and 1853, after the Free Soil successes in 1848-49 and the brief merger with 
Democrats.  As Figure 6 shows, this is clearly the case; the areas of Liberty Party support 
in 1843 remain firmly in the Free Soil camp.  Even as votes for the Free Soil Party 
                                                 
23
 At the time of this article, no maps that are GIS-ready exist for Vermont during this time period at the 
town-level.  A modern map was used, and thankfully, town boundaries were largely established by this 
time; earlier maps were consulted to verify that the units remained largely unchanged.  While the results are 
not affected, two points should be made for clarification.  First, there are a few small white spots on the 
map, corresponding to cities within towns that separated much later from the towns than is dealt with in this 
article.  Second, the county of Grand Isle, which is a series of islands with towns in the far northwestern 
part of the state (Lake Champlain), are pushed inward on this map, as they “border” the mainland towns.          
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decline in 1853, the clusters remain strong supporters.  This is most observable in the 
southern-most cluster, where some of the nearby voting outside the cluster began to 
weaken in its support for the Free Soil Party.24 
 The results of the spatial analysis help further confirm and expand on the findings 
earlier in this article.  First, Liberty Party support was not just a town-level phenomenon; 
towns that voted at higher levels for the party tended to cluster near one another.  Second, 
there is evidence that the Liberty Party did expand from areas of early party successes, 
allowing the party to increase its vote totals.  Third, this allowed the Liberty Party in 
Vermont to transform relatively easily into the Free Soil Party and helped to maintain the 
Free Soil Party, even after the 1848 Van Buren presidential campaign and the brief 
working relationship with the Democrats had ended.  This is strong evidence for the 
argument that the core voting bloc for the Liberty Party, after moving into the Free Soil 
Party, was maintained.  Unlike modern third parties, a true constituency formed and 
maintained partisan attachments and helped the Liberty and Free Soil Parties to achieve 
relative third party success at the ballot box.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The findings presented in this article show that during the 1800s, third parties 
could develop localized bases of support, maintain such bases over time, and use these 
bases to increase voting in surrounding towns.  First, due to the limitations placed on 
communication and transportation, localized development was aided by building support 
                                                 
24
 Using higher upper thresholds for the Free Soil Party vote (up to 40%) provide the same substantive 
results as the 13% threshold for 1852 and 1853, when the average Free Soil vote was higher than 13%.  
These maps are available upon request. 
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in towns with a more educated public and a greater probability of containing “opinion 
leaders” who would be willing to support, and spread the message about, a third party.  
Once this support developed, then the party could build its support within a town.  This 
appears to be the case, for as voting for the Liberty Party increased between 1841-1845, 
the best predictor of a town’s vote percentage for the Liberty Party is the previous 
election cycle’s town vote percentage.   
There was also a neighbor effect on Liberty Party voting, where a town’s 
percentage of the vote for the Liberty Party, and the first year of the Free Soil Party, was 
affected by the average vote percentage for the Liberty Party in neighboring towns in the 
previous election year.  This provides evidence that voting was not an occurrence focused 
solely on individual towns, but that there was likely a social dynamic aiding the 
maintenance of such support among towns.  It also alludes to the argument that, in some 
years, voting was able to diffuse to neighboring towns. 
The bases of support for the Liberty Party carried over to the Free Soil Party and 
helped the expansion of third party voting during this time period.  The spatial analysis, 
combined with correlation results, shows that town-level Liberty Party voting and the 
significant clusters of towns that were more supportive of the Liberty Party in 1843 
helped to increase the party’s vote totals in nearby towns.  These clusters of towns 
continued to serve as strong supporters of the Free Soil Party until that party’s death. 
This article gives scholars an in-depth look into the actual development of third 
party voting, at the state-level, during the 1800s.  Existing research has focused mainly 
on why third party voting has declined across states and at the national level since the 
1800s (Rosenstone et al. 1986; Hirano and Snyder 2007), but this article has shed light on 
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an important preceding question. I have shown that towns with higher levels of education 
were the starting point for the development of third parties in the 1800s.  These groups of 
towns served as the centers of party support before successfully spreading the message to 
neighboring towns, another finding that helps us to understand how third parties could 
contest over multiple election cycles and win government offices.  Finally, these findings 
help to differentiate between the experiences of early and modern third parties, the latter 
of which are not successful at establishing core bases of support.  Overall, the evidence 
adds to our understanding of third parties and party development in the 1800s.  
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Table 5: Year-to-Year Correlations for Town Percentage Vote for Governor, for Each 
Party, 1841-1845 
Year 
 
Whigs Democrats Liberty 
1840-1841 
 
.90 .98 --- 
1841-1842 
 
.93 .98 .73 
1842-1843 
 
.96 .97 .69 
1843-1844 
 
.97 .97 .83 
1844-1845 .97 .97 .93 
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Table 6:  Predicting Percentage of Liberty and Free Soil Party Votes, by Year and by 
Town 
 
Predictors 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 
 
Liberty Vote,  
t-1 
 
--- 
 
.33 
(.05)*** 
 
1.2 
(.12)*** 
 
.75 
(.05)*** 
 
.98 
(.05)*** 
 
.77 
(.06)*** 
 
Liberty Vote 
in Neighboring 
Towns, t-1 
 
--- 
 
.12 
(.05)** 
 
.38 (.23) 
 
.15 (.17) 
 
.18 
(.07)** 
 
.18 (.08)** 
 
 
Absolute 
Difference in 
Major Party 
Vote, t-1 
 
 
.12 (.04)** 
 
 
-.01 (.01) 
 
 
-.03 (.02) 
 
 
.03 (.03) 
 
 
.02 (.01) 
 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
Agriculture 
 
.06 (.04) 
 
-.06 
(.02)*** 
 
.07 (.09) 
 
.09 (.08) 
 
.1 
(.04)** 
 
-.01 (.04) 
 
Manufacturing 
and Trade 
 
.13 (.17) 
 
.03 (.09) 
 
 
.07(.23) 
 
-.24 (.15) 
 
-.17 (.2) 
 
-.2 (.15) 
 
Literate 
 
.78 
(.22)*** 
 
.16 
(.06)** 
 
.09 (.19) 
 
-.36 (.44) 
 
.05 (.16) 
 
.02 (.1) 
 
Town 
Population 
 
.002 
(.0001)** 
 
.0001 
(.0003) 
 
-.0003 
(.0004) 
 
-.001 
(.001) 
 
.001 
(.001) 
 
.002 
(.0005)*** 
 
Constant 
 
-79.25 
(21.61)*** 
 
-13.69 
(5.94)** 
 
-8.30 
(17.29) 
 
38.28 
(43.98) 
 
-7.61 
(16.03) 
 
-1.94 
(9.75) 
Liberty/Free 
Soil Vote % 
 
N= 
F= 
Prob.>F= 
R-Sq.= 
 
 
6.3% 
 
223 
6.7 
.00 
.13 
 
3.9% 
 
225 
98.58 
.00 
.51 
 
7.5% 
 
229 
74.25 
.00 
.44 
 
10.2% 
 
229 
81.96 
.00 
.49 
 
13.5% 
 
230 
149.28 
.00 
.79 
 
14.6% 
 
230 
750.78 
.00 
.80 
Ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors 
are clustered by county. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.    
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Table 7: Year-to-Year Correlations for Town Percentage Vote for Governor, Between 
Liberty and Free Soil Voting 
 
Years Correlation 
1841-1852 
 
.32 
1841-1853 
 
.32 
1842-1852 
 
.36 
1842-1853 
 
.37 
1843-1852 .49 
 
1843-1853 
 
.49 
 
1844-1852 
 
.66 
 
1844-1853 
 
.63 
 
1845-1852 
 
.66 
 
1845-1853 
 
.68 
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Figure 5:  1843 and 1845 Liberty Party Vote in Vermont, by Town, with Spatial Clusters 
from 1843 Represented by Diamonds 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
1843       1845 
 
 
Darker colors indicate higher percentages of the Liberty Party vote by town.  White areas 
indicate 0% of the vote; light gray 1-3%; gray 4-6%; dark gray 7-12%; and black 13% 
and above.  Diamonds indicate towns that were included in spatial clusters, in 1843, as 
generated using SaTScan™.   
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Figure 6:  1852 and 1853 Free Soil Party Vote in Vermont, by Town, with Spatial 
Clusters from 1843 Represented by Diamonds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1852       1853 
 
 
 
Darker colors indicate higher percentages of the Liberty Party vote by town.  White areas 
indicate 0% of the vote; light gray 1-3%; gray 4-6%; dark gray 7-12%; and black 13% 
and above.  Diamonds indicate towns that were included in spatial clusters, in 1843, as 
generated using SaTScan™.   
  
 
Chapter 4 
MINOR PARTIES AND FUSION:  DO THE THIRD PARTIES BEHAVE LIKE REAL 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
The presence of two major political parties is well-established in the United 
States.  Scholars note that this is because of Duverger's Law (1954), which states that 
there is a tendency for two parties to develop in a first-past-the-post electoral system.  
Still, electoral laws can change this two-party dynamic if they provide minor parties with 
a method for institutionalizing their support.  This is typically done through the adoption 
of a proportional representation system, which is noted by scholars as the way in which 
minor parties can take an active role in the political process (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997; 
Katz 1997).   
However, one way that minor parties can exist in a first-past-the-post system is 
through the allowance of fusion candidacies, with the premiere example of this system 
being in New York.  With fusion, a minor party can cross-endorse a major party 
candidate, and in New York, this means that the major party candidate will also appear 
on a separate minor party ballot line.  Minor parties retain the ballot space for four years 
if their candidate receives 50,000 votes in the gubernatorial election.  The cross-
endorsement of a major party candidate is the most common method of accomplishing 
this task.25 
                                                 
25
 There are exceptions.  The 1990 gubernatorial race featured a separate Conservative Party candidate, and 
the Independence Party, until the 2006 election, always nominated millionaire Thomas Golisano for the 
office. 
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Scholars have paid little attention to this distinct electoral arrangement, even though the 
system as implemented in New York allows these fusion (minor) parties to thrive under a 
first-past-the-post system.  Studying this system could illuminate how fusion parties view 
their role in the political process and provide new insights into how these political parties 
operate in relation to the major parties, how they influence policy and major party 
candidates, and whether they function like major political parties.  These findings would 
speak to a wide array of existing scholarship on political parties, electoral systems, and 
state politics and have practical implications for reformers interested in changing state 
election law.  
 I study this electoral system by conducting elite interviews with fusion party 
leaders.  By utilizing interviews, the goal was to obtain detailed, first-hand accounts of 
how these parties and their activists perceive their role in the political process and in the 
formation of public policy.  I found that activists in fusion parties behave and act like 
major party activists and that the electoral system grants these parties more leverage in 
candidate selection and policy debates than one might expect.  Even though candidates 
rarely get directly elected on a fusion party ballot line, the chance that a candidate might 
need votes on a fusion party line, and the threat posed by a fusion party deciding to run 
its own candidate instead of cross-nominating, gives these parties power beyond what 
their vote totals typically suggest.   
These findings are in contradiction to scholarship that views minor parties as little 
more than “pressure groups” (see Schattschneider 1942).  I find that fusion parties 
attempt to harness the goals and desires of politicians to win office and affect policy 
change (Aldrich 1995) much like major parties. Fusion balloting, then, can help to create 
 79 
 
 
  
a multi-party system in a first-past-the-post electoral system. Though major parties still 
want to reduce the amount of electoral competition they face (Cox 1997), candidates will 
support a fusion system if there are positive benefits that can be accrued from receiving 
multiple ballot lines and fusion party endorsements.  This final point helps to answer why 
fusion is accepted in New York, why politicians in Oregon actively supported legislation 
that will bring fusion to statewide elections in 2010, and why this issue demands attention 
as a state-level electoral reform. 
 
Fusion Parties in New York 
 
 There are currently three “fusion” parties in New York, designated as such due to 
their reliance on cross-endorsements of major party candidates:  The Conservative Party, 
the Working Families Party, and the Independence Party.  Each is distinct on the 
ideological spectrum, with the Conservative Party occupying the right-wing, the Working 
Families Party the left-wing, and the Independence Party straddling the “center.”  The 
Conservative Party tends to nominate Republican candidates, the Working Families Party 
tends to nominate Democratic candidates, and the Independence Party makes its 
selections on a case-by-case basis.  Additionally, each party does run its own candidates 
in select races. 
 The oldest of the three is the Conservative Party, which was founded in 1962 in 
response to the leftward shift of the Republican Party in the state.  Its platform is a 
testament to its true ideologically-conservative roots (Conservative Party Website, 2008), 
as the Republican Party in New York is often noted as being less conservative than most 
state Republican Parties.  The Conservative Party was, for a long time, the 
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counterbalance to the Liberal Party, which was founded in 1944 and used cross-
nominations prior to the emergence of the Conservative Party (Liberal Party Website, 
2010).26  During this time, they elected James Buckley to the US Senate in 1970 on the 
Conservative Party line and were able to get William Carney, a registered Conservative, 
elected to the US House of Representatives through the Republican Party in 1978.   
Today, the Conservative Party still operates with a heavy reliance on cross-endorsing 
major party candidates, mainly Republican candidates.   
 The Independence and Working Families Parties are both newer.  The 
Independence Party formed in 1991 and became loosely affiliated with United We Stand 
America and the Reform Party/Perot campaign in 1996.  Its platform is focused on a 
mixture of centrist policies, but they are known for advocating modern populist 
principles, such as adopting initiative, referenda, and campaign finance reform in the 
state.  The party rose to prominence in the state behind Thomas Golisano, a billionaire 
businessman who resided in the Rochester area and was a founding member of the party.  
Golisano was its gubernatorial candidate in the 1994, 1998, and 2002 races, finishing in 
2002 with approximately 14% of the vote.  The party also has a tendency to nominate 
other minor party candidates for president, giving their ballot line to John Hagelin 
(Buchanan’s Reform Party opponent) in 2000 and Ralph Nader in 2004. However, the 
Independence Party has been weakened by rifts in their organization between leftist 
ideologues in the New York City party and more moderate members throughout the rest 
of the state.  After a series of court battles, the Independence Party of New York City 
                                                 
26
 Though they operate a website, the Liberal Party has been all but dead in the state since 2002, after the 
party gave its line to Andrew Cuomo for the gubernatorial race.  Cuomo pulled out of the race and the 
Liberal Party did not have time to replace Cuomo with a new candidate.  They failed to reach the required 
50,000 votes in the gubernatorial election to maintain ballot access, and the party has since been replaced 
by the Working Families Party. 
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tends to operate independently within its sphere of influence (see Independence Party of 
New York City website). 
 The Working Families Party is even newer, having gained official ballot status for 
the first time in 1998.  They campaign on a series of left-wing, progressive topics such as 
“living wages,” increasing and improving public transportation, controlling housing 
costs, and universal health care.  Their greatest successes to date have been in the New 
York City area, and a recent New York Times article noted that the Working Families 
Party played a significant role in the 2009 New York City primary races (Bosman and 
Fahim 2009).  They have also been active in promoting fusion in other states.  The 
Working Families Party started a Connecticut branch of the party in 2002 and in South 
Carolina (Working Families Party Website 2010), and, as will be discussed again later, 
party members helped to push for legislation legalizing a version of fusion balloting in 
Oregon in 2009 (Mapes 2009).  New York State, however, remains the primary focus for 
the party and the establishment and expansion of their message. 
 
What Earlier Scholars Have Said on New York's Minor Party Arrangement 
 
 Most recent research done on the role of minor parties in New York politics can 
be attributed to two scholars, Howard Scarrow and Robert Spitzer.  In Scarrow's book, 
Parties, Elections, and Representation in the State of New York (1983), one chapter 
focuses on the issue of New York's multi-party system and cross-endorsement of 
candidates.  While offering a thorough description of the history of New York's “fusion” 
ballot, the chapter is absent empirical analysis.  In fact, the final section of the chapter is a 
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normative argument for why the system is out-dated and should be done away with. This 
is due to four negative consequences of the fusion system:  the strength of minor parties 
outweighs their electoral strength, the bargaining between major and minor parties adds 
to cynicism about politics, the system does not provide a multi-party system with a wide 
variety of choices, and the system leads to minority election outcomes when a minor 
party enters its own candidate into an election (Scarrow 1983). 
 Spitzer's recent book chapters (1997/2002) are similar to Scarrow's book in 
content.   In Spitzer's book, The Right to Life Movement and Third Party Politics (1987), 
the author does use survey data to investigate party leaders and activists in New York's 
Right to Life Party.  However, the last chapter of the book takes on a normative bent, 
actively opposing Scarrow's position that the system is outdated (this is also a feature of 
Spitzer's articles).  Less normative presentations put forth by Stonecash (1998) and 
Schneier and Murtaugh (2001) cover the same material presented by Scarrow and 
Spitzer. 
 The only prominent published study that looks specifically at the fusion ballot in 
New York is by Michelson and Susin (2004).  They assess whether or not votes for the 
Working Families Party, in a special election for the Nassau County legislature, are 
displaced Democrats or new voters.  Their evidence suggests the latter, though the 
relationship did not hold for other third parties in the election. 
 While a beneficial step in starting to assess the issue of minor parties in New 
York and how electoral arrangements that aid these parties lead to certain outcomes, the 
study is limited.  First, the election chosen was a special election to fill a vacant seat, and 
the office being contested (a seat in the Nassau County legislature) was local in nature 
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and not prominent.  Second, though the authors argue that the election was “highly 
publicized and hotly contested,” turnout was below 30% and the Democrat/Working 
Families/Independence/Liberal candidate won with 58% of the vote, compared with 
22.4% for the Republican candidate and a staggering 19% for the Green Party nominee.  
 Unpublished dissertation work by Shan (1991) studied the decline in State Senate 
competition in New York from 1950-1988.  He found that minor party endorsements 
were critical to major party candidates in three percent of all races when the candidate 
received enough votes to win the election on the minor party ballot line.  This indicates 
that minor party endorsements can influence outcomes in tight races.  A prominent 
example of this outside State Senate races was the 1994 race for governor.  George Pataki 
obtained enough votes to defeat Mario Cuomo only after the Conservative Party totals 
were added to his Republican total.  This is strong evidence that fusion parties matter for 
electoral outcomes in the state, but we do not have a theory about, and knowledge of, 
how the parties view themselves, what their goals are, what their motivations are for 
staying politically active, and how they influence political outcomes.   
 
Fusion Balloting and Electoral Systems 
 
 The effect of the fusion ballot also has implications beyond New York State and 
research on political parties, as understanding the institution can speak to scholars of 
electoral systems.  Fusion balloting was quite common in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
but was ended in many states by the Republican Party, as the system was believed to 
advantage Democrats and Populists, who often fused their ballots (Argersinger 1980).  In 
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one unique example, Populists in North Carolina relied on fusing with the state’s 
Republican Party.  Together, the coalition swept into power in 1896, bringing with them 
a host of black office holders.  When the Democrats were able to regain power in 1898 by 
running a vehemently racist campaign, provisions were put in place to eliminate this 
practice of cross-endorsement from continuing (Faulkner, accessed 2/14/2009).  This 
shows how both major parties were willing to remove the system of fusion balloting 
when it did not work to their electoral advantage. 
 Recently, there have been attempts to bring the system back in some states, 
making it a viable area for study.  In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997), the 
New Party sued the state to allow them to cross-endorse candidates who were willing to 
accept their ballot line.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, found that the State 
of Minnesota could control access to the ballot and prevent the New Party from cross-
endorsing major party candidates, thus limiting the expansion of the fusion system.  
Disch (2002) argues that this decision was a victory for the major parties, as those in the 
majority on the Supreme Court believed that existing laws did not overly burden or 
restrict third parties and that fusion could lead to a confusing ballot in an unstable system 
where political parties are “created” just for the purposes of the ballot.   
 This decision still allows individual states to determine whether fusion is 
allowed, and one prominent attempt to bring back the system has been successful.  In the 
summer of 2009, fusion was approved for use in elections in Oregon after being passed 
through both houses of the legislature and receiving the governor’s approval (Mapes 
2009).  Additionally, the system is still used to a limited degree in Vermont, Connecticut, 
and South Carolina, with the latter two operating under a system that is similar to that in 
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New York.  This will be mentioned again later, as the Working Families Party is working 
to establish themselves as a legitimate force in Connecticut and South Carolina and take 
advantage of the electoral arrangement. 
This brings to light the question of how fusion balloting fits within the broader 
framework of established work on electoral systems, as the system has some role in the 
election processes of some US states.  Katz (1997) breaks down electoral systems into 
four dimensions, those being how the distribution of votes cast translates into seats, the 
format of the choice given to the electorate, the electorate itself, and the candidates and 
their concerns.  The presence of fusion balloting has an effect on all four aspects.   
For translating votes into seats, the fusion system in New York provides third 
parties that cross-endorse the opportunity to “win” elections without necessitating that 
their chosen candidate wins a plurality of votes on the party line.  Since voting for a 
fusion party is counted on a separate party line, and then added to a candidate’s total from 
other party lines, the exact nature of the vote can be broken down by party.  Other fusion 
systems operate with all the endorsements on one ballot line, thus making it harder to 
disentangle whether a candidate received a vote as a major or minor party candidate.  
Thus, the format of the choice is also different than in most American states. 
The electorate itself can also approach the ballot differently.  Instead of merely 
casting a vote for Candidate X on a major party line, a voter can determine whether there 
is symbolic or ideological value in casting a vote for Candidate X on a fusion party line.  
For example, if a candidate has the Republican, Independence, and Conservative Party 
endorsements, a voter who believes the candidate should be more ideologically 
conservative can cast her vote on the Conservative Party line.  A voter with no party 
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affiliation or who is ideologically moderate may choose to cast her vote on the 
Independence Party line to signal to the candidate that she wants a politician who is not 
entirely beholden to the Republican platform.   
Finally, candidates have to accept the cross-endorsement or actively campaign for 
it in some circumstances, which can affect candidates and their concerns.  This adds an 
additional layer of depth to the traditional campaign, as now a candidate could potentially 
campaign for two (or more) party nominations.  Not only does a candidate deal with a 
major party that pressures them, but they also face scrutiny from a second, third, or fourth 
cross-endorsing fusion party.   
 Current literature on electoral systems would suggest that the above concern 
about additional electoral pressure might lead major parties to oppose a fusion system. In 
the book Making Votes Count, Cox noted that, “Successful electoral coordination 
necessarily involves a reduction in the number of competitors” (1997).  This appears to 
explain why Democrats and Republicans during the Populist and Progressive eras were 
willing to discard the system of cross-endorsement in most states when it did not help 
them win office.   
 It would seem, then, to be counterintuitive for the two major parties in New York 
to allow the system to exist and that both parties in Oregon would be willing to adopt the 
fusion ballot.  However, the system can succeed if candidates are self-interested and the 
minor parties serve this self-interest.  As Aldrich (1995) noted, modern political parties 
are no longer focused on the “party principle,” where the party itself is more important 
than the individuals in the party.   Individuals that compose the greater body of parties are 
most important, as parties “are constructed to realize both shared and self-interested 
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goals” (278).  The minor parties in New York that rely on cross-endorsement can exist 
electorally because the members have shared political goals and the candidates they 
endorse have self-interested goals that can benefit from the cross-endorsement.  For 
example, a moderate Republican who is interested in increasing the minimum wage or 
working on lower housing costs shares goals with the Working Families Party and their 
endorsed candidates but still benefits from the collective strength of the Republican Party 
on other issues such as taxes.  In this way, this example candidate has an interest in 
promoting herself on both party lines.   
This also aids the goals of the major and the minor party, both of which are 
concerned with “the regulation of [candidate] ambition to achieve desirable outcomes…” 
(Aldrich 1995, 294).  With a major party, the ability to control candidates with incentives 
is greater than what minor parties can offer.  Still, the ability to cross-endorse grants these 
minor parties the opportunity to provide added incentives to candidates and help with 
their re-election and career goals.  In New York, the greatest incentive is an additional 
ballot line, as the New York fusion system separates out the major endorsement from the 
cross-endorsement.  This also means that the minor party support can be quantified, 
unlike states such as Vermont where the candidate only receives one ballot line with 
multiple parties listed beneath her name. Also, minor parties do have resources that are 
made available to candidates who win a nomination, especially in terms of manpower for 
campaign activities.  
For candidates to have continued access to cross-endorsement, minor parties must 
receive 50,000 votes or more on their party line for governor to continue to have 
statewide ballot access.  The easiest way to do this is through cross-endorsing a major 
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party gubernatorial candidate. Major parties and their candidates benefit by undercutting 
potential third party opposition, and minor parties can help “benefit-seekers” (Aldrich 
1995) and candidates achieve their long-term goals, too.  In the 1990 gubernatorial 
election, the Republican candidate failed to win the Conservative Party nomination and 
almost received fewer votes than the Conservative Party’s own candidate.  Then, in 1994, 
Republican George Pataki narrowly defeated Democratic Governor Mario Cuomo after 
the votes he received on the Conservative Party line were tabulated into his total.  
Conservative Party elites were appointed to state positions as a result (cite).  These fusion 
parties, then, exist because they can help ambitious candidates win office, they reduce 
overall ballot competition, and they can help push for shared policy goals across major 
party lines in an era of candidate-centered elections.      
  
Developing Systematic Expectations 
 
 The first step in developing a relevant theory of fusion parties must first establish 
whether these are truly “political parties.”  They rarely win elected office outright, and, as 
Spitzer has pointed out, they might not want to win office when they can obtain benefits 
through cross-endorsement (Spitzer 2006).  This viewpoint implies that these minor 
parties can be viewed more as “pressure groups,” since they do not want to control office, 
or as “educational movements” rather than “genuine parties” (Schattschneider 1942).   
I argue that such an assessment is too facile when observing New York.  The 
fusion parties in New York are organized attempts to gain political control through 
winning elections, which is a crucial factor in Schattschneider’s definition of a political 
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party.  The problem is that winning elections is a different calculus in New York than it is 
in other states.  As William Riker asserts, “when the definition of winning forces 
candidates to maximize votes in order to win…they [candidate] have strong motives to 
create a two-party system; but when the definition of winning does not require them 
[candidates] to maximize votes…then this motive for two parties is absent” (1982, 755; 
parenthetical insertions mine).   
In a sense, the fusion system falls somewhere between these extremes.  
Candidates still need to maximize votes in order to win, but this can occur across party 
labels because each party label is separate.  For the fusion parties, then, winning under a 
system of cross-endorsement does not require that the candidate maximize her vote on 
their party line, so long as the candidate they endorsed is maximizing votes across all 
party lines. We can expect the fusion parties of New York to act like major political 
parties, though with a different definition of electoral victory than is held by the major 
parties; these are not “pressure” groups that are not concerned with winning office.  Thus, 
the election of cross-endorsed candidates can be viewed as a sign of party strength and 
influence, especially when an election is close. 
 
Expectation One:  The fusion parties in New York will view themselves as legitimate 
political parties and will view electoral victory largely through the election of cross-
endorsed candidates as a means to achieving their policy goals. 
 
 Another aspect of political parties set forth by Schattschneider is that major 
parties have supremacy over minor parties.  However, in the case of New York, accounts 
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note how major party politicians often appeal to the minor parties for their support and 
fear losing their support.27 The additional fusion party line can serve as a method for 
“branding” a candidate (Downs 1957) as being a true conservative, if they win the 
Conservative Party nomination, or a true liberal, if they win the Working Families Party 
nomination.  Still, the fusion parties do need to be somewhat deferential to the candidates 
put forth by the major parties to be effective.  The Conservative Party would likely not 
survive if they refused to cross-endorse a majority of the Republican candidates, and the 
same holds true for the Working Families Party and its relationship to the Democratic 
party.  In return, activists in fusion parties can receive patronage positions when an 
endorsed major party candidate is elected, providing an incentive to go along with a 
major party’s wishes (Schneier and Murtaugh 2001). 
 There are times, however, when a fusion party will run its own candidate, even if 
a candidate is not a legitimate threat to the major parties.  In general, major party 
candidates want to limit competition in their district (Aldrich 1995), especially if the race 
might be close, and running a non-viable candidate does not help the fusion party obtain 
benefits from a major party in this scenario.  This makes a fusion party’s decision to run 
its own candidate relatively rare for major offices.   
In some situations the fusion parties appear to push their chosen candidate 
through a major party’s primary process, eliminating the need to run their own candidate 
on their own ballot line.  This occurred in the case of Tim Gordon, who was the 
Independence Party’s selection to run for the state legislature in 2006 in Assembly 
District 108 after the incumbent Republican assemblyman chose not to run.  Gordon, the 
                                                 
27
 Edward Koch, when mayor of New York City, was once quoted as saying in 1982:  “I believe that the 
people of the state of New York are finding that the minor parties are the tail that wags the dog, and are 
seeking to impose their candidates on the major party” (taken from Spitzer 2006). 
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vice chair of the Albany County Independence Party (Benjamin 2006), entered and won 
the Democratic Party line and ran a successful general election campaign, winning a seat 
in the state legislature.  Thus, the system appears to be more symbiotic than an absolute 
dominance by the major parties, even if the major parties hold actual power and are the 
stronger organizations. 
  
Expectation Two:  The fusion parties are aware that their role in the system relies on the 
major parties, though at the same time, they are keenly aware that the major parties are 
reliant on them as well.  Thus, the fusion parties will tend to cross-nominate ideologically 
similar candidates and will try to work within the two-party framework to pursue electing 
their own candidates. 
 
There are situations in this fusion system where the Conservative Party nominates 
a Democratic candidate or the Working Families Party nominates a Republican.  I argue 
that access to the policy-making process will play a role in these cases.  Cross-
endorsement will provide the proverbial “foot in the door” needed to influence a 
politician’s political behavior.  Policy cannot be influenced without a channel for 
communications, and opening your party line to a candidate, even if less ideologically 
similar than most cross-endorsed candidates, can be the necessary component.  To 
achieve party ends, there are times when some ideological flexibility is needed.28 
This does not mean that the parties operate without regard for ideology, for each 
party does have a specific label that provides information to the voter (Downs 1957).  
                                                 
28
 For the Independence Party, which pursues “centrist” policies, it is unclear what ideology they are, as it 
varies.  However, for the Conservative and Working Families Parties, ideological flexibility is clear. 
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What it does mean is that electoral considerations can, under certain circumstances, lead 
a fusion party to support a candidate from an ideologically opposite major party if the 
minor party believes it can influence the candidate on some issue/subset of issues.  This 
should not be too surprising, as current political parties are faced with the problem of 
harnessing the ambitions of individual politicians into outcomes that are desired by the 
party (Aldrich 1995).  For fusion parties, this will include nominating candidates from a 
major party that is often seen as being generally opposed to its party platform. 
 
Expectation Three:  Fusion parties will cross-endorse candidates that are from an 
ideologically opposite major party to achieve their goals of electoral victory and policy 
influence when they believe a candidate can be influenced on a subset of issues.29 
 
 These three expectations focus more on the electoral aspect of the fusion parties 
and their goals/motivations, which are connected to the concept of “party-as-
organization”; deciding who to nominate is the essential function of these parties (Key 
1964).  What has not been touched upon are the ways in which the fusion parties function 
once their endorsed candidates are put in office.  The next step, then, is to try and develop 
expectations about how fusion parties view their relationships with the major parties. 
 Since cross-endorsement is believed to be a “foot-in-the-door” for the fusion 
parties to influence legislators, the fusion parties will have some agenda, or set of issues, 
that they wish to pursue once in office.  Though each fusion party has a party platform, a 
strategic party would emphasize a different agenda based on what is being dealt with in 
                                                 
29
 One addendum to this is that a major party candidate does not have to accept the cross-endorsement and 
may choose to decline it.  In this case, the major party candidate will likely win office, and the fusion party 
would have no “foot in the door” to influence policy goals. 
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the state capitol, county seat, or city council.  This is especially true given that the fusion 
parties cannot set the legislative or media agendas (Baumgartner and Jones 1993); they 
must work within the framework set by the major parties. 
 
Expectation Four:  Fusion parties will have a limited role in setting the legislative and 
media agendas, thus forcing them to adapt their policy agenda to the issues that the major 
parties deem important at that time. 
 
 Another purpose that the fusion parties could serve is to be a check on the major 
parties and their behavior.  In the electoral sense, a politician who was nominated by the 
Working Families Party who begins to vote against liberal legislation will likely lose the 
party’s nomination in the next election cycle.  When an election is not on the horizon, the 
Working Families Party will warn that politician that her behavior will not be tolerated 
and that opposing more liberal legislation will likely result in the loss of the party’s 
nomination.   
 Framed differently, the fusion parties will act as ideological “shadow” 
governments for the major parties.  The Conservative Party does function in this role, 
providing legislative scores for the State Assembly and Senate based on votes on key 
pieces of legislation.  While the other parties do not go this far, I expect to see that all 
fusion parties monitor those politicians they endorse in some way, whether through 
formal meetings or informal conversations.  Additionally, the fusion parties likely search 
for candidates they did not endorse in the last election but proved themselves sufficiently 
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conservative/liberal/centrist in their legislative voting to garner a nomination in the next 
election cycle. 
 
Expectation Five:  Fusion parties will monitor legislative behavior, especially as it 
regards cross-endorsed candidates, and they will attempt to keep their endorsed 
candidates voting in an ideologically-consistent manner on policy. 
 
 It is also necessary to uncover what keeps the activists and leadership of the 
fusion parties motivated.  Ideological desires and policy play roles even when candidates 
rarely win outright on a fusion party line.  Unlike minor parties outside a fusion system, 
the “wasted vote” syndrome that pushes people away from third parties is not a factor 
when cross-endorsements are the norm (see Riker 1982; Palfrey 1989; Feddersen 1992).  
The activists and leadership of fusion parties do not feel as though they are undercutting 
their ideological brethren in a major party. 
 This leaves us with a puzzle as to why supporters remain in a minor party.  I 
would expect that a large number of activists have developed a partisan attachment at the 
state level, especially in the Conservative Party, which has existed longer than the 
Working Families and Independence Parties.   Since these parties also nominate national-
level candidates who are running in their state, not just candidates interested in state 
offices, individuals would not need to have split partisan identifications at the state and 
national levels.30  The leaders become entrenched in the party and will see it as a 
legitimate, long-term attachment (see Michels 1949). 
                                                 
30
 This would be possible if, for example, the state parties did not cross-nominate presidential, House, and 
Senate candidates.  In Canada, many individuals have split partisan identifications between the provincial 
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Expectation Six:  Leaders and activists in fusion parties will view themselves as partisans 
of their chosen party across all levels of government offices.   
 
 These expectations, generated by theory about how political parties and activists 
operate and think, are generalized examples of what is expected by interviewing elites 
within the fusion parties.  They form a baseline from which to work and tie these 
interviews into broader conceptions of political parties, governance, and partisanship. 
 
How to Extract Information in the Interviews 
 
 To obtain the necessary information to test the expectations, I conducted 
interviews with leaders and activists in the Conservative, Independence, and Working 
Families Parties.  The goal of the questioning was to elicit responses about:  party goals 
at the state and local level, what the party hopes to achieve, and the individual activist’s 
perceptions of the party and his or her motivations for being active in it.  I allowed the 
interviews to move away from my general line of questioning to ensure that the 
interviewees could best express their views and perceptions about their roles in the fusion 
parties.  I was still able to obtain answers to my questions, even if they were not 
presented in such a straightforward manner, depending on the tone and direction on the 
interview.  The following are the main questions that I wanted answered: 
 
− What goes into your party’s decision to cross-endorse? 
                                                                                                                                                 
and national level, depending on how parties operate in their province. 
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− When does your party choose to run your own candidate, and when do you choose to 
avoid an election? 
− What do you hope to accomplish by cross-endorsing/running your own candidate? 
− Do you feel your party has been able to influence local or state policy?  How so? 
− Do you feel your party is electorally-successful, or a failure? 
− Are you aware of the activities of party members in X part of the state? 
− How are your relations with the party you cross-endorse/the party you do not cross-
endorse? 
− Do you see yourself as a member of the X party at both the state and national level, or 
do you feel you are a member of a different party nationally? 
 
These questions are expected to be answered differently depending on the region 
of the state, the level of the election being discussed, and an individual interviewee’s own 
personal biases.  Through these questions, a host of insights into the organizational 
structure and electoral desires of the parties were obtained, as well as knowledge about 
how individual activists perceive themselves within their party. 
The interviews were conducted through two methods:  by telephone and by 
electronic mail.   The first was the preferred method of communication.  In the latter case, 
the “interview” took place over an email or series of emails to ensure that proper answers 
to the general questions were obtained and that the interviewee had a chance to add his or 
her own comments/perceptions.  I gave the interviewees open-ended questions and 
provided space for them to express their points of view without feeling limited by choices 
in a survey.  This is advantageous, as some of these individuals are reluctant to take part 
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in a phone interview.  These are not career-politicians with years of experience answering 
questions, and the individual party contacts all have varying levels of handling an 
interview.    By offering the email option to those who expressed interest in it, they were 
able to take part in this project without having to go through an interview process that 
would make them uncomfortable (and potentially unable to focus on the task of 
answering questions properly). 
 For telephone interviews, the length varies from approximately 10-12 minutes in 
the fastest case to over 1 ½ hours in the longest.  This variation is a product of my 
attempt to ensure that I am not coercing anyone into talking beyond what they would like, 
but probing those most interested in participating to give adequate details and stories.  
From those most interested in being interviewed, I have been able to receive information 
that would not have been available through my general, basic interview framing.  By 
being flexible in the interview process, I obtained more information than would have 
been collected by survey responses.  To help me organize these interviews, and think 
about the interview process, I relied on Dexter’s (1970) book on elite and specialized 
interviewing for guidance. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Nine interviews were conducted with party activists in the Conservative Party (4), 
the Independence Party (2), and the Working Families Party (3).  Only one was 
conducted by e-mail, and this was for a Conservative Party contact.  Information about 
who to contact was obtained through party websites, which list local contacts and 
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executive committee members, depending on the party.  Though this number is small, the 
interviewees were forthcoming with information about their parties, other parties, and 
politics in New York.31  I present my findings by attending to each expectation in either 
its own subsection or in conjunction with a similar expectation when supporting 
information overlaps. 
 
Expectation One:  The fusion parties in New York will view themselves as legitimate 
political parties and will view electoral victory largely through the election of cross-
endorsed candidates as a means to achieving their policy goals. 
 
 The first step is to address Expectation One, which was that fusion parties view 
themselves as legitimate political parties that achieve victory through having their cross-
endorsed candidates elected.  The Conservative Party leaders see their party as relatively 
successful, with standards for success varying from electing cross-nominated politicians 
to obtaining over 10% of the vote on their party line to receiving more votes for the 
Conservative candidate than there are registered Conservative Party members.  Receiving 
such vote totals also “justifies their existence,” in the words of one interviewed party 
activist.  The Conservative Party is also strongly committed to the fusion system, and one 
                                                 
31
 I started with listing contacts for the three parties based on information on party websites.  This list 
contained 51 Conservative Party activists, 21 Independence Party activists (6 of which were members of 
the breakaway Independence Party of New York City), and 21 Working Families Party activists.  This is 93 
total contacts.  However, as the interview process began, it was found that some contacts had information 
that was no longer up-to-date.  Furthermore, there were some people listed who other people, in interviews, 
told me were no longer active in the party.  The latter problem was most acute for the Independence Party, 
which has been facing problems within their organization.  Additionally, one Independence Party 
interviewee noted that the party was not interested on uploading and updating contact information on the 
web.  I plan on continuing this process after the dissertation, but I am confident that the information I 
obtained from these individual activists helps to answer the expectations put forth in this chapter.  There 
was amazing consistency across parties for several of the expectations, which will be discussed in text. 
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leader noted that the party’s success did not rely on running its own candidates.  Doing 
so, and performing badly, would “taint” the party’s image and make it less effective at 
pressuring Republican candidates on policy.  At the same time, this particular interviewee 
made a point to emphasize that the Conservative Party also served to “educate” the 
public, which is largely composed of “zombie voters” who vote only based on partisan 
identification, and alert them to the lack of distinction between the Republicans and 
Democrats in the state.  Success, it would appear, is also based on alerting the public to 
the purported dangers of two-party dominance.   
The Independence Party and Working Families Party interviewees also noted 
these as good measures of success, as well as trying to be the “difference-maker” in an 
election by providing enough votes to a major party candidate in a close race to defeat 
another major party candidate.  One interviewee from the Working Families Party used 
the term “leverage party” in describing its role. 
Additionally, the Independence and Working Families Parties perceived victory in 
several other ways.  For the Independence Party, maintaining a partisan balance at the 
state-level (divided government) was mentioned as a key goal.  As the political party that 
represents the “non-partisans,” the Independence Party pursues a moderate platform, and 
cross-endorsing both Democrats and Republicans who win office allows it to apply 
pressure on policy that transcends the partisan divides.  For the Working Families Party, 
victory also occurs when they successfully influence the Democratic Party to seek 
progressive-minded candidates for public office, not “corrupt Albany politicians.”  This 
provides evidence that these parties see themselves as viable parties through cross-
nomination that play a role in the political process and affect electoral outcomes. 
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Expectation Two:  The fusion parties are aware that their role in the system relies on the 
major parties, though at the same time, they are keenly aware that the major parties are 
reliant on them as well.  Thus, the fusion parties will tend to cross-nominate ideologically 
similar candidates and will try to work within the two-party framework to pursue electing 
their own candidates. 
and 
Expectation Three:  Fusion parties will cross-endorse candidates that are from an 
ideologically opposite major party to achieve their goals of electoral victory and policy 
influence when either a.) a fusion party believes the candidate can be influenced on a 
subset of issues and/or b.) the district is not competitive. 
 
 For Expectations Two and Three, interviewees from all three parties noted that 
they try to nominate ideologically-similar candidates for state-level races.  Politicians 
who want a party line are given surveys, quizzes, or are asked to come in front of a small 
group to answer policy-related questions.  For local races, where policy choices are less 
partisan, the ability to obtain a party line is easy and the questioning process, if there is a 
formal one, is less rigorous.  These nominations also cross party boundaries, with 
Working Families interviewees quite willing to admit to nominating good Republican 
candidates and Conservative Party interviewees stating that they are not opposed to 
nominating Democrats.   
Based on Expectation Three, though, it appears that this is done at the state-level 
when candidates agree with a fusion party’s platform and that district competitiveness 
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plays less of a role.  In Upstate New York, where the unions are more conservative and 
Republican than downstate, a Working Families Party interviewee noted that the 
endorsement of liberal Republican candidates occurs more regularly.  For the 
Independence Party, balancing endorsements to ensure a more centrist government in 
Albany plays a role.  In one interview, the “best” candidate varied by region, with 
incumbent Republicans downstate receiving the party line over incumbent Democrats; 
they will only endorse “insurgent” Democrats who oppose the current Albany leadership.  
These examples make clear that if a candidate for state office does not have the proper 
issue positions, she rarely gets the cross-nomination (though two interviewees noted that 
state party leaders within their respective parties have entered the selection processes to 
override a decision not to nominate).   
 While it appears that the Conservative Party, the oldest of the three, is content 
with this style of politics, both the Independence and Working Families interviewees 
noted that their parties are waiting for the opportunity to push out from beneath the two 
party arrangement with cross-endorsement.  One interviewee noted that the Independence 
Party was winning seats, on its party line and/or with its chosen candidates, in many 
towns and villages.  This grassroots success was noted as being essential if the party was 
to maintain itself as a successful entity without relying on cross-nominations.  Another 
Independence Party interviewee stated that the party was trying to move away from its 
past connections to the Perot campaign and the Reform Party, whose supporters had 
merely waited for a “white knight” to ride in and bring the “Ottoman Empire” of political 
parties to prominence. To try and move away from this, the party has started focusing 
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more on local and county elections, and one leader noted that the Independence Party is 
trying to strengthen its base in the African-American and Latino communities. 
The Working Families Party has also been able to win office without cross-
nomination in recent years.  The party was able to elect its own candidates to office in the 
New York City area on its own party line, and even upstate elections in Binghamton and 
Albany have seen candidates that were pushed by the Working Families Party win 
Democratic primaries and get elected to office.  This appears to be more prominent in this 
party than in others, largely because of the party’s ties to unions, which serve with 
members of citizen action groups on the party’s endorsement committee. The Democrats 
need to keep these groups content as they are both strong parts of their support base.  In 
the future, as one interviewee noted, the party wants to maintain itself as an independent 
political organization that can stand as a viable third party.  This same interviewee also 
described in detail how s/he and other party members were working on finding qualified 
candidates and training them to run professional-style campaigns without the support of 
either major party.  In some circumstances, one interviewee claimed the Democrats 
actually hire Working Families Party members to conduct campaigns for Democratic 
candidates and that the party has been successful at doing this on Long Island and in 
Upstate. 
The findings provided show clear support for Expectation Two, some support for 
Expectation Three, and additional evidence that shows how the Independence and 
Working Families Parties are oriented toward a future without the need to cross-
nominate.  From a “parties-as-organizations” perspective, the fusion parties of New York 
are working to win office via cross-endorsement, and two of the parties are planning for 
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future endeavors that do not require fusion balloting by focusing efforts on winnable 
local and state races.   
 
Expectation Four:  Fusion parties will have a limited role in setting the legislative and 
media agendas, thus forcing them to adapt their policy agendas to the issues that the 
major parties deem important at that time. 
and 
Expectation Five:  Fusion parties will monitor legislative behavior, especially as it 
regards cross-endorsed candidates, and they will attempt to keep their endorsed 
candidates voting in an ideologically-consistent manner on policy. 
 
For Expectation Four, which addresses how the fusion parties can affect policy, 
the findings follow my earlier beliefs.  The fusion parties admit that they are limited in 
their capacity to affect what policies get addressed in Albany.  One point that was made 
clear by a Conservative Party interviewee is that the partisan make-up of the state limits 
how much the party can actually “do”; instead, they have to try and protect what is.  This 
aligns with findings by scholars such as Krehbiel (1998) that show how legislative 
minorities are more adept at blocking, rather than passing, legislation. 
A prime example here occurred when former Governor Eliot Spitzer came out in 
support of the state issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented workers.  The Conservative 
Party leaders and activists used this as a litmus test for its cross-endorsed candidates and 
told them that they need to oppose this to keep their ballot lines in the next election.  
While other factors played out that caused Spitzer to back down from his position, this 
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mobilization of influence by the Conservative Party played some role in affecting how 
Republicans in Albany reacted to this proposed policy. 
The same can be said of the Independence Party.  One interviewee stated that the 
party had a two-fold mission:  promote small-d democratic reforms in the state, such as 
referenda and initiative, and work toward winning elections to ensure that the state 
government remains divided with a Democratic Assembly and a Republican Senate.  
While the Independence Party believes it has made strides at creating divided 
government, helping to block clearly partisan legislation from passing, the party has been 
unable to push through any of its small-d democratic policy reforms.   
The Working Families Party leaders viewed their mission as one based on 
progressive politics.  The goal of the party was not to be liberal on moral issues such as 
abortion and women’s rights, which one interviewee said were issues that had been 
handled in the past.  Instead, the party’s goal is to improve conditions for working class 
residents of New York, with issues such as economic development, housing, and raising 
the minimum wage.  Leaders did make it clear, however, that the issues of importance 
vary within the state; the needs of the working class in New York City and the 
surrounding metropolitan area are somewhat different than the concerns of workers in 
smaller Upstate cities such as Binghamton.  To date, the party’s core is largely based in 
the New York City area, and its greatest successes up until now have been in this area 
(not at the state-level). Still, the party has successfully pushed Albany politicians on 
supporting issues such as minimum wage legislation, providing some limited evidence of 
helping to create policy change.  Of course, since they are aligned more closely with the 
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Democrats, who control the lower house, the Working Families Party is not like the 
Conservative or Independence Parties, who are more focused on blocking legislation. 
Either way, the fusion parties are forced to adapt to the policy agendas of the 
major parties, limiting their strength outside the electoral arena.  In both the Conservative 
and Working Families cases where they pushed elected state government officials on a 
particular issue, that policy in question was moved onto the legislative and media agendas 
without the fusion parties; they could only adapt to what was prominent.   
This also shows that the fusion parties monitor legislative behavior and attempt to 
keep their politicians voting in the correct ideological direction, which comports with 
Expectation Five. The Conservative Party goes beyond the other parties by scoring 
Assembleypersons and Senators based on voting records for key bills.  Still, the other 
parties do have their own methods for monitoring behavior, which include regular 
meetings with cross-endorsed officials and checking legislative vote records.  In the 
words of one Working Families Party interviewee, the party has tried to hold “the 
bastards [major party politicians] accountable.”  Another Working Families Party 
interviewee put it best when s/he described how to cross-nominate while still retaining 
party distinctiveness as a process of “how to get into bed with a huge elephant without 
getting crushed.”  This interviewee noted that interviews were necessary to gauge 
sincerity in the party’s message and to ensure that the “huge elephant” could be 
controlled. 
 Across the three organizations, it appears that all see themselves as legitimate 
political parties that are able to influence elections and get their endorsed candidates 
elected with a limited influence on the policy process.  All leaders noted that elected 
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politicians who received their party’s cross-nomination are scrutinized and questioned if 
they vote too often against the party’s platform, and often these politicians contact party 
members to get clarification on a position to see whether a yea or nay vote would go 
against the legislative goals of a minor party.   
 
Expectation Six:  Leaders and activists in fusion parties will view themselves as partisans 
of their chosen party across all levels of government offices.   
 
Finally, Expectation Six regarding interviewees and their partisan identifications 
have largely been borne out.  Each interviewee emphatically stated that they are not only 
members of the party for ballot purposes, but that they identify themselves as a party 
member at the state and national level.  This was best exemplified by a Conservative 
Party leader who noted that his or her statement of party identification at conservative-
oriented conferences often confuses attendees, who are largely Republican Party 
identifiers.   
Most of the interviewees also noted that they felt alienated from the major parties 
in the state, a hallmark of anti-major party identifiers, and many had been registered with 
one (or both) of the major parties at some point in their life.  One Conservative Party 
interviewee noted how s/he started as a Democrat but left for the Republicans because of 
the party’s sad performance at the local level.  Then, this interviewee left the Republican 
Party about 15-20 years ago because s/he felt that the Republican Party in the state no 
longer stood for any particular ideology. Another Conservative Party interviewee stated 
that s/he moved to the party when s/he became angered by a particular Republican 
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candidate and felt that his/her political activities would prove more effective in a minor 
party.  For the Independence Party, both interviewees said they became engaged in the 
early 1990s around the formation of the party, one in particular stating that it was Perot’s 
United We Stand America organization that began his/her foray into New York politics.  
For the Working Families Party, one of the interviewees from downstate noted that s/he 
was a Democrat but that there was no choice in many elections, which led to corruption 
within the Democratic Party and a lack of accountability.   
This ability to be a minor party identifier yet have an active role in the electoral 
process has kept many engaged for long periods of time, as much as 20 years or more in 
the case of some Conservative Party activists.  This point is important for establishing 
that these fusion parties are really “political parties,” as third parties at the state- and 
national-levels often have problems retaining support once a prominent candidate leaves.  
Because of the electoral arrangement, fusion parties can receive a low-level of support on 
their party line from election-to-election yet maintain loyal partisans who help to drive 
the party efforts. 
 Taking the six expectations together, it appears to be quite clear from the 
interviews that the fusion parties in New York, operating under a different set of electoral 
rules, are true political parties that affect the course of politics in the state and are, by 
their standards, electorally successful.  This comports with Schattschneider’s writings on 
political parties that indicate a true political party has electoral success and has some 
influence over policy outcomes (1942), even though winning office is not the main goal 
of these fusion parties. 
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What This Tells Us About Electoral Systems 
 
 Now that it is established that these fusion parties are more than “pressure 
groups,” an interesting question arises for the study of electoral systems:  Why do the 
major parties allow the system to continue?  As noted earlier, scholars have long noted 
that political parties want to reduce competition in the electoral arena, and on the surface, 
it would appear this is the case.  The major party candidates who are already 
ideologically-similar to the minor party that cross-nominates them takes away a party line 
that could be used for another candidate while offering the minor party policy 
representation at the state- or local-level.   
 But, based on the interviews, the fusion parties are not merely cross-endorsing.  
Instead, they are pursuing an active agenda, monitoring legislative behavior, pressuring 
representatives when necessary, and, at times, pushing their own candidates through 
major party primaries so that the Democratic or Republican candidate is really the choice 
of the minor party.  This goes against the idea of less competition, as it forces the major 
parties to attend to the wants and needs of the minor fusion parties.  
 Based on this literature, it is unclear why this system is not eliminated, except for 
the fact that New York state government is typically divided.  In an interview conducted 
in 2008 with an Independence Party leader, s/he noted that then Governor Eliot Spitzer 
planned on eliminating cross-endorsements should the Democrats win control of the State 
Senate (they already dominated the State Assembly).  Apparently, the Independence 
Party leaders wanted confirmation from Spitzer’s office that the process of fusion ballots 
would not be done away with should the party cross-nominate Democrats instead of 
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Republicans for a few State Senate seats, helping to create a unified Democratic state 
government and going against its own principles of maintaining divided government.  
Unofficially, it was claimed by the interviewee that Spitzer’s office refused to make this 
promise.  I brought this issue to the attention of people I interviewed in the Working 
Families Party.  One interviewee was aware of the rumor but was not as concerned, as the 
party plans on contesting elections with or without the fusion system. 
 This does, however, illuminate why major parties in other states would be 
resistant to allowing such a system in their state.  If it became a well-utilized electoral 
institution, fusion could place additional pressures on the major parties and increase 
competition within major party primaries and increase tension over the direction of 
policy.  It already does so in New York.  A recent article by a Republican columnist calls 
for the elimination of fusion ballots, as he believes the Conservative Party is effective in 
pushing Republicans statewide into taking strong stances on moral issues when 
conservative economics should be of utmost importance (Edelman 2008). 
 Members of both the Working Families and Independence Parties are aware of 
this potential in other states and are, to some degree, trying to exploit it by pushing 
themselves nationally.  In the Working Families Party, the leaders noted that the 
organization has representation in other states that allow fusion, notably Connecticut and 
South Carolina. The Independence Party, which was originally tied to the Reform Party 
of Ross Perot (and his pseudo-political party before this, United We Stand America), has 
made advances into national politics.  Frank MacKay, the current chair of the New York 
Independence Party, worked with other party leaders to launch the Independence Party of 
America.  This new national organization is affiliated with the remaining Reform Party 
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remnants in states such as Minnesota and Kansas, and it has also been able to win over 
several similar “independent” parties.  If these attempts begin to take root, there is the 
possibility that fusions systems are adopted and/or used more extensively in other states.  
These attempts will likely not be welcomed by most major parties, as they want to cut 
down on potential sources of competition.   
 
The Oregon Case 
 
 Still, there at least appears to be an incentive on the part of candidates to try and 
push for fusion balloting in some states.  In July 2009, the governor in Oregon signed a 
bill that would allow fusion balloting and make it easier for independent candidates to 
have ballot access (see Oregon SB 326).   Two parties that could benefit from this new 
arrangement that were noted in an article cited earlier from The Oregonian are the 
Working Families Party, which recently organized and helped push for this legislation in 
the state, and the Independent Party of Oregon, which is a nomination that both 
Republicans and Democrats in the state want to seek out (Mapes 2009).   
Specifically, the Oregon legislation allows a candidate to be listed with a 
maximum of three party endorsements under her name on the ballot.  The final version of 
the bill passed in the House with a 43-16 vote and in the Senate with a 25-5 vote.  In the 
House, Republicans favored the bill 17-6 and Democrats favored the bill 26-10; in the 
Senate, all Republicans supported the bill and the Democrats favored it 13-5.  Since the 
legislation was passed in July 2009, the first major election under these new rules will 
 111 
 
 
  
take place in November 2010.  It is not yet clear, though, how much it will be utilized in 
this first election and what affect it will have.      
  The question remains as to why the legislation passed.  A preliminary argument 
is that the party brand could be effective in winning over independent voters in a state 
with a strong independent streak, as was pointed out by Mapes (2009).  Based on the 
findings from New York, the fusion system can help to “signal” to voters what candidates 
are adequately liberal, moderate, and conservative.  Republican candidates could distance 
themselves from their party’s image by winning the Independent Party of Oregon’s 
nomination, helping them to win over voters who are skeptical of the Republican label.    
This appears to be a candidate-centered push, too.  To quote directly from Mapes 
(2009):  “Bob Tiernan, chairman of the Oregon Republican Party, said his party had not 
been involved in the fight over the bill and didn’t have an opinion on it.”  The 
Democratic Party and the Oregon Education Association were opposed to the measure, 
fearing that minor parties might be created that are “nothing more than an attractive brand 
name” (Lane 2009).    Even so, the majority of Democratic legislators and senators went 
against the party wishes and supported SB 326.  Future research will certainly need to 
address the role that candidates play in opposing their own political parties when it comes 
to adopting or expanding the role fusion plays in state politics. 
 
The Broader Research Agenda 
 
 The theory and findings developed above are an initial step into a larger project 
that will focus on fusion politics.  The interviews conducted provided insights into the 
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process that have not been discussed in the political science literature yet have an effect 
on political outcomes.  While the nature of New York politics made most of the 
interviewees skeptical and secretive about the “behind the scenes” information that would 
have added to this chapter, I was still able to obtain information that allows scholars to 
critically think about how this relatively unique electoral arrangement shapes politics. 
 Interviews aside, there are a number of potential studies that could build from 
these initial findings.  Whether these would be independent from this chapter is unclear at 
this time, but combining empirical work with these interviews could be the start of a 
manuscript.  Either way, it is pertinent at this time to address some of these potential 
studies, even if they were mentioned earlier in this chapter or will appear in the 
concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
 In regards to New York, legislative behavior could be affected by cross-
endorsements.  Patterns of introducing, sponsoring, and voting on legislation could exist 
outside the two-party dynamic, and fusion could potentially affect how polarized the two 
major parties become at the state-level.  Instead of Republican and Democratic Party 
“networks” of officials, there could be close working relationships between Conservative, 
Independence, and Working Families Party legislators that are masked by focusing on 
major party labels.  This could also affect legislative committees and committee 
assignments. 
 In regards to Oregon, the state’s recent move to a fusion system is ripe with 
potential research projects.  Much like the New York case, legislative behavior could be 
affected.  However, the recent implementation of the system provides the opportunity to 
see what types of candidates go for cross-endorsements and from what types of districts, 
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whether the cross-endorsed candidates work together on legislation that crosses the 
traditional two-party divide, and if incumbent legislators from before the reform change 
behaviors (voting, sponsorship) once they accept cross-endorsements. 
 Similar issues can be studied in states where fusion is used but to a lesser degree 
(Connecticut, Vermont, and South Carolina).  Additionally, studying why minor parties 
in some of these states are less likely to utilize fusion than in other states could prove 
useful in better understanding state elections, institutions, and electoral laws.  While these 
ideas have not been pursued at this point, they at least illuminate the potential findings 
that could grow from this first attempt to look into the theoretical implications of fusion 
politics on political parties and politics in general.      
 
Conclusions 
  
After conducting interviews with leaders and activists in the fusion parties of New 
York, the findings indicate that the fusion parties are much more than interest groups that 
pressure the Republican and Democratic Party candidates.  Instead, these parties actively 
participate in the electoral process, nominating candidates and attempting to push their 
own chosen candidates through major party primaries.  They exert pressure on major 
party candidates to vote in accordance with their policy positions by threatening to pull 
their nomination.  Since major party candidates prefer to decrease electoral competition 
and have multiple ballot lines, this is a credible threat.  In this way, New York’s system 
can be characterized as a multi-party system, even if the electoral changes do not lead to 
minor party-only candidates winning seats in the State Assembly or Senate. 
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 From an electoral systems standpoint, this also shows how changing ballot 
structure can affect the ability of minor parties to survive in an otherwise two party-
dominant environment.  It does reduce the number of candidates on a ballot, but increases 
how much outside pressure is exerted on existing candidates.  This can be viewed as 
detrimental to some elected major party officials, but as the Oregon case pointed out, the 
ability to “fuse” could provide benefits through signaling that a candidate is more/less 
moderate than her major party identification alone could tell a voter.   
 Normatively, then, this institutional arrangement can benefit third parties within 
the framework of a first-past-the-post system.  Lest states begin to change to proportional 
representation systems, or some hybrids of it, fusion balloting may be the best option 
available for minor parties to continually contest elections and play a role in the political 
process.  Without this system, it is improbable that minor parties will ever reach the 
heights of success that they were able to achieve at the state-level throughout the 1800s 
and into the early 1900s (see Hirano and Snyder 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5 
OVERALL FINDINGS CONCERNING THIRD PARTIES 
 
The previous three chapters have each touched upon a particular aspect of context 
in relation to third party support.  Chapter 1 did so by studying how a “subculture” of 
non-major party support affects how individuals evaluate third party candidates, paying 
particular attention to Ralph Nader’s 2000 campaign for the White House.  Chapter 2 
took a different angle, showing that the Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the 1840s-1850s 
were able to maintain high levels of support by generating and maintaining voting bases 
at the local level and building off these areas of past electoral successes.  Chapter 3 
looked at fusion balloting and how this particular institutional rule allows third parties to 
play an active role in the political process, influencing major party electoral behavior and, 
at times, policy outcomes.  
These three chapters are clearly disparate in their approaches and unique in their 
contributions to the political science literature.  However, each offers a piece to a broader 
theoretic puzzle about context and its effects on the success of third parties in American 
politics.  First, I argue that the findings of the first two chapters illuminate differences in 
party building strategies for third parties from the 1800s to modern elections.  Second, I 
argue that the development of stronger modern third parties is hindered by ignoring the 
effects of geographic context on citizen behavior and offer an example of a third party 
success story within a first-past-the-post electoral system (the New Democratic Party of 
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Canada).  Third, I then explain how the use of fusion balloting, as studied in Chapter 3, 
alters how third parties develop and discuss how cross-nominations could advantage third 
parties in the long-term.  Fourth, I conclude with several avenues for future research that 
build on Chapters 1-3 and the general findings of this dissertation.        
 
Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Approaches to Party Building 
 
 One of the key findings of this dissertation is that third party successes in the 
1800s involved the development and maintenance of localized bases of support.  The 
examples of the Liberty and Free Soil Parties in Vermont show how the parties were able 
to earn the support of residents in particular towns and then spread party support to 
nearby towns from these “voting bases.”  This approach to party organization can be 
labeled as “bottom-up,” as the goal was to establish the party within particular towns and 
use these towns for future electoral expansion. 
 This contrasts directly with modern experiences with third parties and 
independent political movements.  In these examples, such as Nader, Perot, Anderson, 
and Wallace, the goal was not to build from the “bottom-up” but to structure support 
from the “top-down.”  Context still matters, as there are variations in how individuals 
react to such candidates based on past third party voting in their respective counties.  
However, these subcultures do not necessarily lead to higher levels of voting or more 
favorable assessments of these candidates across all ideological groups in the population. 
 We see from these findings that geographic context plays a crucial role in 
understanding support for third party candidates in both cases.  The question then 
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becomes one of how modern third parties (and independent candidates) fail to develop 
consistent bases of geographic support across election cycles, as found in Vermont during 
the 1840s.  To answer this, the bottom-up and top-down approaches to party building 
require further elaboration. 
 In the 1800s, institutional and cultural factors gave third parties particular 
advantages that do not exist today that allowed them to build from the bottom-up.  From 
the perspective of a burgeoning organization like the Liberty Party, it was logical to try 
and win the support of particular towns.  In Vermont especially, where each town had a 
state representative, elections were yearly, and the electorate was small enough so that 
winning over a handful of voters could lead to the expansion of the party message and 
victory in future election cycles, the “bottom-up” strategy made sense.  Such strategies 
enabled the Free Soil Party and late 1800s parties, such as the Populists, to win seats in 
state legislatures and in Congress.  While they were not going to have the same 
nationwide appeal in presidential elections as the Democrats or Republicans/Whigs, they 
could elect representatives and play a substantive role in the direction of American 
politics and policy. 
Since the demise of the Progressives in the 1920s, no third party or independent 
political movement has been very successful at the national level at establishing support 
over election cycles, even for a brief period, and creating an alternative to the two-party 
message.  Except for a few cases, third parties and independent candidates have been 
virtually shut out of positions in state legislatures and in Congress.  This, I argue, is due 
to the changing nature of politics. Districts have tended to increase in size and population, 
the electorate has been expanded to include essentially the entire adult population over 
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the age of 18, career politicians have become the norm, which also leads to increases in 
the resources necessary to compete, and ballot access has been severely restricted for 
third parties.  These put a damper on the ability of third parties to develop voting bases 
that can be consistent in support from year-to-year.   
Instead, recent elections have been typified by candidate-centered third party runs 
and independent movements that, first and foremost, emphasize the offices of president 
and governor.  Resources have become more crucial to electoral success, politicians are 
more career-oriented, and the media is more concerned with the two major parties in 
today’s election milieu.  To gain media attention and resources to run their campaigns, 
independent and third party movements rely on well-known personalities, those with 
money, and/or former major party politicians.  Two third party gubernatorial wins during 
the 1990s were little more than major party politicians temporarily striking out at odds 
with their past major party identification (Lowell Weicker in Connecticut [Connecticut 
People’s Party] and Walter Hinckel in Alaska [Alaskan Independence Party]).  The other 
third party and independent candidate victories, Jesse Ventura in Minnesota and Angus 
King in Maine, were both based largely on their fame and name recognition.   
All of these movements and campaigns failed to assemble the groundwork for a 
successful third party that could continuously campaign and win seats at the local, state, 
and Congressional levels.  For example, the Reform Party put its emphasis on the 
presidential level, leading to its destruction after the 2000 election year.  Without Perot to 
serve as the party’s guiding hand, the movement collapsed into two groups, thus 
destroying the party as a cohesive organization.  George Wallace, the former pro-
segregation Democratic governor of Alabama, and Ralph Nader, a consumer advocate-
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turned-presidential candidate, both latched on to existing third parties (the American 
Independent and Green Party, respectively), and neither party has been able to reach that 
level of success again.  Continuing this trend is the fact that minor, non-viable third 
parties continue to put resources into presidential races while continuing to fail at 
establishing the party in any geographic area.  In other words, third parties are not 
developing consistent bases of support and working at using these bases to expand their 
support to other areas.  To do so, third parties need to focus on areas with the greatest 
potential for developing support and understanding who to target for support, thus 
following the findings presented in Chapter 1.  
 
The Effects on Third Party Success 
 
 These different approaches to party building have lasting effects on the long-term 
success of third parties and their candidates from a contextual perspective.  As noted in 
the previous section, third parties in the 1800s and early 1900s worked at establishing 
support in particular locations, leading to higher vote totals at the ballot box and elected 
officials at the state and national levels.  Modern third parties have failed to do so, 
focusing efforts on charismatic Presidential and gubernatorial candidates instead of the 
party itself. 
 Still, context plays a role in modern elections, albeit much different than in the 
1800s.  Today, the contextual effect of a strong third party “subculture” affects individual 
survey respondents yet it does not always push individuals to vote for third party 
candidates.  This is distinctly different from the case of Vermont in the 1840s, where 
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consistent patterns of voting for a third party were linked directly to past support for said 
third party at the town level.  Certain communities were more prone to support and vote 
for third parties. 
In modern third party “subcultures” of third parties, a candidate that is viewed 
quite favorably by a potential voter does not always lead to a vote for that candidate.  To 
understand why, the answer lies in the strategies of party-building pursued by modern 
third party movements.  It appears from the detail laid out in the previous section that the 
emphasis on large, candidate-centered campaigns, even if the norm in modern politics, 
significantly limits third parties from developing over time. First, a party that cannot 
internally generate experienced, charismatic candidates to compete against career 
politicians is likely to continuously lose; even individuals in more supportive subcultures 
may be reluctant to vote for candidates who they like but feel are unable to govern 
properly.  Second, third parties are not focusing solely on those areas where they could 
build a stronger local and state party base.   
 Third parties in the United States need to address these concerns if they want to 
be stable, electorally successful organizations.  Other political parties in first-past-the-
post systems have learned these lessons.  In Canada, the New Democratic Party (NDP) is 
the traditional national third party, having won seats at the national and provincial levels 
dating back to the 1960s.  They have done so by focusing on Western and urban areas, 
especially in the Maritime provinces, that feel alienated by the prevailing strength of the 
Liberal Party in representing the interests of Ontario and Quebec.  Its current party leader 
at the national level, Jack Layton, is, on average, rated more favorable than all the other 
national party leaders in survey after survey, including in the 2003 and 2006 Canadian 
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Election Studies.  The NDP continues to be the party with the fourth highest seat total in 
Parliament, reflecting a reality for third parties:  favorability does not always translate 
into victory. 
 NDP, unlike their US counterparts, elect local and provincial candidates, have 
resources more comparable to the other major Canadian parties, and understand where 
they can generate the most potential support (and do so).  Yet, even with this knowledge 
and with a well-liked party leader, the NDP is still not involved in forming the Canadian 
government.  This is an underlying lesson that grows from the findings in this dissertation 
and the experience of one third party in Canada: the current emphasis on top-down, 
candidate-centered campaigning has limited modern day successes for third parties in the 
United States while the regional, bottom-up development did help third party successes in 
the 1800s and early 1900s. 
 
How Fusion Parties Fit In 
 
 This perspective on third parties and their ability to succeed by building on 
contextual support changes when we look at states that allow fusion balloting.  In the 
dissertation, Chapter 3 focuses solely on the case of New York, where fusion balloting is 
used most prominently, and investigates how this different electoral context circumvents 
some of the issues faced by third parties who must compete without the ability to cross-
endorse candidates.   
 First, from a party building perspective, fusion parties do not necessarily need to 
generate high levels of support to be “successful.”  By either winning enough votes to 
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help their cross-endorsed candidates win, or by pushing their chosen candidates through 
major party primaries, fusion parties are able to have a direct effect on actual electoral 
outcomes without having to win in a traditional sense.  Unlike the third parties of the 
1800s and early 1900s, there does not need to be as much of an initial push to develop 
and spread the party message, so long as a minimum state-level requirement can be 
reached to maintain ballot access.  Unlike modern third party and independent campaigns 
at the national level, they do not have the same issues with finding qualified candidates 
and can function like legitimate political parties, endorsing candidates from the local to 
the presidential-level while still playing an active role in state and local governance. 
 This does not mean that the fusion parties in New York have not developed an 
organizational structure and a party message.  The possibility of the fusion system being 
eliminated spurred quick commentary from those interviewed, and the interviewees 
tended to be quite positive about traditional electoral success in the future.  Both the 
Independence and Working Families Party interviewees expressed a willingness to start 
competing as lone entities, especially at the local level where each has had limited 
success.  One Independence Party interviewee even noted that s/he had pushed for 
emphasizing local races and building party support in certain locations back when the 
party was still associated with the national Reform Party, which was noted earlier in this 
chapter as being one that emphasized a “top-down” approach.  In fact, this particular 
person claimed to have thrown his/her hat in the ring for the 2000 vice presidential 
candidacy at the Reform Party convention for the sole purpose of delivering a speech 
which lambasted members of the party for caring too little about state and local party 
development. 
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This strategy that the interviewee supported, and that is currently being 
implemented to varying degrees by the fusion parties in New York, is more in-line with 
earlier third party movements than modern third parties.  It parallels the NDP example, as 
the fusion parties are identifying the geographic areas where they are most successful and 
working to develop stand-alone support in these contexts. The Working Families and 
Conservative Parties are also working to define themselves as distinct political 
organizations with a platform that is not represented by either major party, thus following 
in the footsteps of most third parties in addressing major party failure. 
 It therefore appears that the parties being nurtured in a fusion arrangement could 
advantage themselves when, or if, they attempt to push more of their own candidates 
rather than relying on cross-endorsement.  Regardless of this possibility, the fusion 
arrangement allows third parties to develop in such a way as to fit between the “bottom-
up” or “top-down” approaches, but does not necessarily preclude them from focusing 
more on a “bottom-up” approach in the future.  At the very least, the arrangement 
provides fusion parties and their activists with valuable political experience, allows them 
to make important contacts in the political world, and provides a groundwork upon which 
the parties could develop independently of cross-endorsement. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
 The empirical chapters of this dissertation show how support for, the development 
of, and the political strength of third parties in the United States has been structured by 
context.  These findings also speak to scholars interested in political parties, contextual 
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effects, historical political science, state politics, voting, and elections.  Sections of this 
dissertation should be of interest to a broad swath of American political scientists. 
 These statements should not be interpreted as evidence that this dissertation 
addressed all that had yet to be studied about third parties; plenty of questions remain.  
Each chapter has illuminated different areas of potential future research that I, or some 
other enterprising scholar, could endeavor to study.  Highlighting the potential projects 
that can branch off from these dissertation chapters will further emphasize the importance 
of my work to the broader literature (and the literature on third parties). 
 Chapter 1 uncovered how individual respondents were affected by their third 
party voting context in modern presidential races, finding differential effects across 
ideology and partisanship.  Moving beyond the individual-level, this chapter cannot 
speak to what makes particular counties more prone to such voting.  The measure of 
context was the average vote at the county-level for Perot in both presidential runs and 
John Anderson in 1980.  No other county-level factors were presented in the models. 
 One potential study from this chapter would look for demographic differences 
between counties with above average third party voting in these elections compared to 
below and about average counties.  If third party and independent candidacies attract 
certain types of voters and certain counties have a greater propensity to vote for said 
candidates, then trying to isolate underlying demographic differences between low and 
high third party voting counties could prove to be a useful endeavor.  A survey could also 
be distributed to residents in a random sample of the lowest, highest, and average 
counties to compare political attitudes across third party subcultures.  
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 Chapter 2 showed how third parties in the 1800s were able to develop geographic 
bases of support and spread such support to neighboring towns over several election 
cycles.  In generating this support, third parties were able to win state offices and take 
part in making government policy, sometimes taking majority control of state 
governments.  Future work could explore the ability of these parties to control the voting 
activities of their members in the state legislature and if third party representatives voted 
in a way that more closely aligned with their constituency’s partisan leanings than their 
major party counterparts.   
 Chapter 3 found that the “fusion” parties of New York behave like legitimate 
political parties in an electoral system whereby victory can be quantified without winning 
a majority of votes on their party line.  From this chapter, two potential projects seem 
fruitful.  First, the effect of cross-endorsement on state legislative voting patterns could 
be tested in New York, Vermont, South Carolina, and Connecticut.  These states that 
utilize fusion provide different district dynamics, systems of fusion balloting, levels of 
partisan competitiveness, levels of professionalism, and, most importantly, varying levels 
of the use of fusion elections.  
Second, with the adoption of a fusion system in Oregon, we have a modern switch 
to the system that was adopted by the state government itself and signed into law by the 
governor.  This creates a natural experiment with legislators being voted back into office 
with a new additional “party brand” attached to their name after they legally went back 
and changed the law to allow this. Studies could look at a host of issues related to voting 
in the legislature, representing constituency interests, and legislative coalitions that 
transcend major party boundaries. 
 126 
 
 
  
 All these potential projects branch off from the empirical chapters of my 
dissertation that argue that the study of third parties in the United States must not neglect 
the issues of geographic and electoral context.  I have found that context affects 
individual behavior towards, and the organizational behavior of, third parties.  These 
contextual effects also affect the ability of third parties to compete and be successful in a 
two-party dominant environment.   
The findings here can have an effect inside the subfields of contextual, historical, 
and third party studies, but they could also be of importance to those outside the 
academy.  Current and future third parties should pay heed to context when considering 
where to campaign, what individuals to target in particular areas, how to develop a party 
base over several elections, and what institutional arrangements can help them to play an 
active political role.  Therefore, this dissertation and its findings have scholarly and 
practical value that I hope will shape the course of research and real-world political 
outcomes.  
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APPENDIX A:  CHAPTER 2 
 
Table 1A:  Predicting Perot Support in the 1996 NES Pre-Election Sample 
Predictors Baseline 
Model 
(Perot 1992) 
Baseline 
Model (Perot 
1992/Anderson 
1980) 
Full Model 
(Perot 1992) 
Full Model 
(Perot 
1992/Anderson 
1980) 
Context 
(Percentage) 
 
-.08 (.10) -.26 (.16) .04 (.61) -.26 (.99) 
Democrat -27.57 
(1.34)** 
 
-27.63 (1.33)** -24.97 
(4.43)** 
-24.28 (4.59)** 
Independent -17.75 
(1.44)** 
 
-17.74 (1.44)** -14.90 
(4.94)** 
-15.57 (5.15)** 
No Preference/Other 
 
-20.32 
(2.12)** 
 
-20.41 (2.12)** -16.53 
(7.30)* 
-13.38 (7.44) 
Conservative 
Ideology 
 
5.23 (3.57) 5.39 (3.57) 1.79 (11.85) -1.18 (12.66) 
Slightly 
Conservative 
Ideology 
 
7.12 (3.57) 7.27 (3.57)* 6.02 (11.76) 5.44 (12.59) 
Moderate Ideology 
 
5.02 (3.49) 5.19 (3.49) 3.89 (11.54) 1.17 (12.35) 
Slightly Liberal 
Ideology 
 
4.67 (3.68) 4.87 (3.68) 7.87 (12.23) 5.68 (13.15) 
Liberal Ideology 
 
3.07 (3.84) 3.24 (3.84) 6.54 (12.43) 4.97 (13.41) 
Extreme Liberal 
Ideology 
 
2.91 (5.46) 3.05 (5.46) 16.86 (16.80) 14.16 (18.34) 
Not Political  
 
5.98 (3.51) 5.94 (3.50) 7.37 (11.44) 4.37 (12.17) 
Democrat x Context 
 
--- --- -.13 (.22) -.26 (.35) 
Independent x 
Context 
 
--- --- -.14 (.25) -.16 (.39) 
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No Preference/Other 
x Context 
 
--- --- -.20 (.39) -.57 (.60) 
Conservative x 
Context 
 
--- --- .18 (.64) .54 (1.04) 
Slightly 
Conservative x 
Context 
 
--- --- .06 (.64) .17 (1.03) 
Moderate x Context 
 
--- --- .06 (.62) .34 (1.02) 
Slightly Liberal x 
Context 
 
--- --- -.17 (.66) -.04 (1.07) 
Liberal x Context 
 
--- --- -.19 (.67) -.11 (1.09) 
Extreme Liberal x 
Context 
 
--- --- -.79 (.91) -.90 (1.49) 
Not Political x 
Context 
--- --- -.08 (.62) .14 (1.01) 
 
Sex (Men=1) 
 
 
1.74 (1.05) 
 
1.76 (1.05) 
 
1.71 (1.06) 
 
1.77 (1.06) 
Age 
 
.02 (.03) .02 (.03) .02 (.03) .02 (.03) 
Education 
 
-.21 (.34) -.18 (.34) -.21 (.34) -.15 (.34) 
Race (White=1) 
 
-.74 (1.54) -.34 (1.55) -.55 (1.56) -.09 (1.58) 
Urban to Rural  
 
-.34 (.85) -.09 (.86) -.43 (.86) -.16 (.87) 
Attention to 
Campaign  
 
-1.77 (.80)* -1.76 (.80)* -1.80 (.81)* -1.75 (.80)* 
Care Who Wins 
Election 
  
-2.02 (1.41) -2.00 (1.41) -2.05 (1.42) -2.10 (1.42) 
Voted for Perot in 
1992 
 
2.09 (1.63) 2.18 (1.63) 2.06 (1.64) 2.11 (1.64) 
Margin of Major 
Party Vote 
-.05 (.07) -.01 (.08) -.05 (.07) -.02 (.08) 
Constant 
 
70.61 
(4.78)** 
71.23 (4.74)** 68.18 
(11.77)** 
70.75 
(12.46)** 
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N=1608 
F=25.11 
Prob.>F=.000 
Adj. R-
Sq.=.2308 
 
N=1608 
F=25.23 
Prob.>F=.000 
Adj. R-
Sq.=.2317 
 
N=1608 
F=16.79 
Prob.>F=.000 
Adj. R-
Sq.=.2276 
 
N=1608 
F=16.88 
Prob.>F=.000 
Adj. R-
Sq.=.2287 
Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors.  Two-tailed tests. 
**p<.01; *p<.05. 
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Figure 1A:  Ideology's Effect on Perot Favorability Based on Perot's 1992 County Vote
 
 
Source:  1996 NES Pre-Election Sample 
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Figure 2A:  Partisanship's Effect on Perot Favorability Based on Perot's 1992 County Vote
 
Source:  1996 NES Pre-Election Sample 
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Table 2A:  Predicting Perot Favorability in 1992 with Anderson 1980 Context in the 1992 
National Election Study (NES) Pre-Election Sample 
 
Predictors Baseline 
Model 
Full Model 
Context (Percentage) 
 
.08 (.21) 4.11 (1.12)** 
Democrat 
 
.93 (1.85) 5.83 (3.93) 
Independent 
 
7.67 (1.71)** 11.55 (3.79)** 
No Preference/Other 
 
3.30 (3.42) 7.07 (7.14) 
Conservative Ideology 
 
1.30 (3.84) 25.07 (8.18)** 
Slightly Conservative 
Ideology 
 
2.04 (3.80) 26.67 (8.18)** 
Moderate Ideology 
 
3.06 (3.71) 22.78 (8.00)** 
Slightly Liberal Ideology 
 
4.56 (3.97) 29.05 (8.57)** 
Liberal Ideology 
 
-1.86 (4.07) 26.12 (8.91)** 
Strong Liberal Ideology 
 
-1.58 (5.28) 2.05 (11.11) 
Democrat x Context 
 
--- -.78 (.54) 
Independent x Context 
 
--- -.61 (.52) 
No Preference/Other x 
Context 
 
--- -.71 (1.04) 
Conservative x Context 
 
--- -3.83 (1.17)** 
Slightly Conservative x 
Context 
 
--- -3.94 (1.16)** 
Moderate x Context 
 
--- -3.17 (1.13)** 
Slightly Liberal x Context 
 
--- -3.85 (1.20)** 
Liberal x Context 
 
--- -4.25 (1.21)** 
Extreme Liberal x Context --- -.91 (1.48) 
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Sex (Men=1) 
 
2.73 (1.29)* 2.81 (1.29)* 
Age 
 
-.20 (.04)** -.20 (.04)** 
Education 
 
-.39 (.41) -.31 (.41) 
Race (White=1) 
 
2.44 (2.06) 1.93 (2.08) 
Urban to Rural 
 
2.13 (.90)* 2.53 (.91)** 
Attention to Campaign (-) 
 
-1.59 (.53)** -1.49 (.53)** 
Care Who Wins Election 
(No=1) 
 
.10 (.89) -.06 (.89) 
Margin of Major Party 
Vote 
 
.09 (.13) .08 (.13) 
Constant 45.66 (5.59)** 19.84 (8.83)* 
 
 
 
N=1667 
F=4.99 
Prob.>F=.0000 
Adj. R-
Sq.=.0413 
 
N=1667 
F=4.26 
Prob.>F=.0000 
Adj. R-
Sq.=.0502 
Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors.  Two-tailed tests. 
**p<.01; *p<.05. 
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Figure 3A:  Ideology's Effect on Perot Favorability Based on Anderson's 1980 County Vote
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Figure 4A:  Partisanship's Effect on Perot Favorability Based on Anderson's 1980 County Vote
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Table 3A:  Predicting Buchanan Favorability 
 
Predictors NAES Rolling Cross-Section, 
1999-April 2000  
NAES Rolling Cross-Section, 
Last Month Before Election 
Perot’s 1996 County Vote 
(Percentage) 
 
.45 (.65) -.47 (.47) 
Democrats 
 
-4.65 (4.38) -6.95 (3.06)* 
Independents 
 
.11 (3.96) -11.74 (2.88)** 
Conservative Ideology 
 
-6.36 (6.64) -12.56 (4.69)** 
Moderate Ideology 
 
-17.11 (6.66)** -21.83 (4.73)** 
Liberal Ideology 
 
-21.32 (7.30)** -29.04 (5.17)** 
Strong Liberal Ideology 
 
-30.24 (10.62)** -30.39 (6.98)** 
Democrat x Perot County 
 
-.02 (.48) -.11 (.33) 
Independent x Perot County 
 
-.33 (.43) .90 (.32)** 
Conservative x Perot County 
 
-.15 (.71) .23 (.52) 
Moderate x Perot County 
 
.06 (.71) .40 (.52) 
Liberal x Perot County 
 
.27 (.79) .97 (.57) 
Strong Liberal x Perot County 
 
.15 (1.24) .46 (.81)  
Sex (Men=1) 
 
2.58 (1.04)* .33 (.73) 
Age 
 
-.16 (.04)** -.18 (.02)** 
Race (White=1) 
 
-1.53 (1.63) -5.42 (1.35)** 
Education 
 
-1.34 (.24)** -1.57 (.17)** 
Suburban 
 
-4.65 (4.38) 1.71 (.87)* 
Rural 
 
-1.74 (1.58) 2.53 (1.13)* 
Interest in Government 
 
3.42 (.62)** 3.75 (.46)** 
Care Who Wins Elections -.07 (1.19) 1.94 (.93)* 
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Margin Between Major Parties 
in 2000 
 
--- -.02 (.04) 
Constant 73.90 (6.88)**  70.43 (4.90)** 
 
  
 
N=2408 
Adjusted R-Sq.=.1218 
F=16.90 
Prob.>F=.0000 
 
N=4866 
Adjusted R-Sq.=.1457 
F=38.71 
Prob.>F=.0000 
Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.  Two-
tailed tests.  **p<.01; *p<.05.   
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Figure 5A:  Ideology's Effect on Buchanan Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
 
Source: NAES Cross-Section, December 1999-April 2000 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 139 
 
 
  25
30
35
40
45
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
V
al
u
es
 
o
f B
u
ch
an
an
 
Fa
v
o
ra
bi
lit
y
0 5 10 15 20
Perot ' s County Vote in 1996 By Percentage
 Republican  Independent
 Democrat
Figure 6A:  Partisanship's Effect on Buchanan Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
 
Source:  NAES Cross-Section, December 1999-April 2000 
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Figure 7A:  Ideology's Effect on Buchanan Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
 
Source:  NAES Cross-Section, October 2000 to Election Day 2000 
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Figure 8A:  Partisanship's Effect on Buchanan Favorability Based on Perot's 1996 County Vote
  
Source:  NAES Cross-Section, October 2000 to Election Day 2000 
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Table 4A:  Predicted Probabilities of Buchanan Vote Choice, by Ideology and Partisanship, Across Contexts 
 
Predicted probabilities generated using CLARIFY (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001).  All other control variables are set to their 
mean or median values except for the suburban and rural dummies, with suburban=1 and rural=0. 
 
 
Scenarios Strong 
Conservative 
Republican 
Conservative 
Republican 
Conservative 
Independent 
Moderate 
Independent 
Liberal 
Independent 
Liberal 
Democrat 
Strong 
Liberal 
Democrat 
Suburban, Minimum 
Context 
 
1.6% 1.2% 2.2% 1.9% 1.1% 1.6% 11.7% 
Suburban, Mean Context 
 
1.6% 1.2% 3.8% 1.7% 2.0% 0.7% 1.2% 
Suburban, Maximum 
Context 
 
5.8% 2.6% 12.4% 2.5% 13.0% 1.1% 0.9% 
∆ Min-Max +4.2% 
 
 
+1.4% +10.2% +.6% +11.9% -.5% -10.8% 
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APPENDIX B:  CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
Table 1B:  Summary Statistics for Liberty/Free Soil Vote Percentages, Absolute 
Differences in Major Party Vote Percentages, and Average Liberty/Free Soil Vote 
Percentages for Neighboring Towns 
 
Predictors N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Liberty/Free 
Soil % 
 
     
1841 228 6.21 9.13 0 70.7 
1842 237 3.77 4.98 0 29.8 
1843 234 7.74 9.72 0 43.75 
1844 237 10.89 11.17 0 57.14 
1845 236 14 13.17 0 61.15 
1846 
 
236 14.46 12.41 0 55.34 
Absolute 
Differences in 
Major Party 
Vote % 
 
     
1840 235 29.54 22.7 0 100 
1841 228 25.82 21.21 0 95.24 
1842 237 26.62 22.39 0 100 
1843 234 27.94 22.68 0 100 
1844 237 28.44 21.93 0 100 
1845 236 26.65 21.77 .3 100 
1846 
 
236 29.22 22.6 0 100 
Average 
Liberty/Free 
Soil % for 
Neighboring 
Towns 
 
     
1841 239 6.41 4.85 0 25.56 
1842 239 3.88 2.73 0 13.11 
1843 239 7.97 6 0 30 
1844 239 11.06 6.59 0 28.9 
1845 239 14.43 8.19 0 36.93 
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Table 2B:  Summary Statistics for Predictors from 1840 Census 
 
Predictors N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Population 
 
 
240 
 
1214.65 
 
726.68 
 
53 
 
4271 
% in Agriculture 
 
240 26.1 8.32 5.43 64.94 
% in 
Manufacturing/Trade 
 
240 3.57 2.61 0 14.16 
% Literate 240 99.29 1.42 91.06 100 
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Table 3B:  Predicting Percentage of Liberty Party votes, by year and by town, without 
accounting for past Liberty Party voting at t-1 or past Liberty Party voting in neighboring 
towns at t-1 
Predictors 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 
 
 
Absolute 
Difference in 
Major Party 
Vote, t-1 
 
 
.12 (.04)** 
 
 
-.02 (.01) 
 
 
-.04 (.02)* 
 
 
-.01 (.03) 
 
 
-.02 (.04) 
 
 
-.06 
(.03)* 
 
Agriculture 
 
.06 (.04) 
 
-.03 (.03) 
 
.03 (.12) 
 
.11 (.1) 
 
.22 
(.11)* 
 
.2 (.11) 
 
Manufacturing 
and Trade 
 
.13 (.17) 
 
.12 (.08) 
 
 
.17 (.27) 
 
-.08 (.19) 
 
-.25 (.26) 
 
-.5 
(.2)** 
 
Literate 
 
.78 
(.22)*** 
 
.48 
(.12)*** 
 
.74 
(.32)** 
 
.2 (.61) 
 
.27 (.79) 
 
.21 
(.78) 
 
Town 
Population 
 
.002 
(.001)** 
 
.0005 
(.0005) 
 
.00001 
(.001) 
 
-.0007 
(.002) 
 
.00002 
(.002) 
 
.002 
(.002) 
 
Constant 
 
-79.25  
(21.61)*** 
 
-43.67 
(10.54)*** 
 
-66.54 
(28.40)** 
 
-10.25 
(60.14) 
 
-16.49 
(77.91) 
 
-10.12 
(77.34) 
 
N= 
F= 
Prob.>F= 
R-Sq.= 
 
 
223 
6.7 
.00 
.13 
 
225 
8.52 
.00 
.05 
 
231 
3.8 
.02 
.03 
 
231 
.76 
.59 
.01 
 
231 
2.39 
.1 
.03 
 
231 
6.6 
.00 
.04 
Ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors 
are clustered by county. ***p<.01, **p<.05, * p<.10.    
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